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Abstract	  
	  A	  stable	  and	  competitive	  exchange	  rate	  is	  imperative	  for	  efforts	  to	  diversify	  an	  economy	  in	  an	  open	  economy	  setting.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  exogenous	  economic	  and	   political	   factors	   in	   Brazil	   and	   other	   emerging	  market	   economies	   that	   accentuate	   the	  difficulties	  of	  shifting	  toward	  a	  more	  developmentalist	  economic	  policy.	  Nevertheless,	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  or	  more	  Brazil	  has	  developed	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  tools	  that	  enable	  the	  country	  to	  address	  the	  exogenously	  determined	  factors	  related	  to	  exchange	  rate	   instability.	   	  These	  tools	   have	   been	   a	   modest	   success	   at	   best,	   but	   lay	   the	   groundwork	   for	   what	   may	   be	   the	  necessary	  economic	  policies	  and	  political	  conditions	  for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  program	  to	  achieve	  stability-­‐led	  diversified	  growth	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	   Brazil	  is	  unique	  in	  its	  ability	  not	  to	  suffer	  from	  a	  serious	  natural	  resource	  curse	  due	  to	  the	  oil	  sector	  as	  so	  many	  other	  nations	  have.	  	  The	  authors	  note	  that	  Brazil’s	  earlier	  period	  of	   state-­‐led	   industrialization	   (despite	   limitations	   in	   other	   areas)	   helped	   diversify	   the	  economy	   –	  which	   has	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   industry	   in	   the	   Gross	   National	   Product	   (GNP)	   in	  comparison	   to	   other	   Latin	   America	   countries	   –	   and	   bolster	   institutions	   such	   that	   oil	   has	  largely	  been	  a	  blessing	  rather	  than	  a	  curse.	  	  	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  commodity	  boom	  in	  the	  2000s	  threatened	  the	  delicate	  balance	  	  Brazil	  was	  able	  to	  achieve.	  This	  boom	  had	  specific	  features	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  previous	  ones	  as	  it	  was	  boosted	  not	  only	  by	  real	  factors	  (supply	  and	  demand	  shocks,	  such	  as	  huge	  Chinese	  imports),	  but	  also	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  financialization	  of	  commodity	  prices,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  growing	   influence	   of	   financial	   investor	   positions	   in	   commodity	   futures	   markets	   (Unctad,	  2011a	   e	   2011b,	   Bicchetti;	   Maystre,	   2012).	   Significant	   accentuation	   of	   the	   volatility	   in	  commodity	   prices—particularly	   in	   iron	   ore,	   soya,	   and	   beef	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   context—
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combined	  with	  other	  forces	  to	  create	  the	  very	  dynamics	  that	  can	  put	  the	  resource	  curse	  into	  motion.	   	  Those	  dynamics	  are	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  (defined	  as	  the	  price	  of	  the	  domestic	   currency)	  and	  a	  hollowing	  out	  of	   investment	   in	  non-­‐commodity	   sectors	   that	  are	  potentially	  more	  productive	  and	  employment	  intensive.	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  Brazil	  has	  been	  blessed	  and	  cursed	  with	  high	  commodity	  prices	  (from	  2003	  to	  mid-­‐2008	  and	  2009-­‐2011)	  and	   low	   interest	  rates	   in	   the	  core	  economies	  after	   the	  2008	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Such	  an	  environment,	  coupled	  with	  the	  high	  domestic	  policy	  rate	  and	  the	   sophistication	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   financial	   system,	   has	  made	   Brazil	   a	  much	   sought	   after	  destination	   for	   carry	   trade	   operations	   through	   short-­‐term	   financial	   flows	   that	   are	   largely	  transmitted	  through	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  derivatives	  market.	   	  Speculative	  operations	   into	  this	  market	  have	  accentuated	  the	  upward	  pressure	  on	   the	  exchange	  rate,	  which	  has	  come	  with	  higher	   commodities	  prices,	   leading	   to	  what	  we	   refer	   to	  here	  as	   “a	   financialization	  of	  the	  resource	  curse”.	  	  This	  concept	  means	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  commodity	  prices,	  one	  key	  determinant	  of	  the	   Brazilian	   exchange	   rate	   path	   has	   been	   financial	   investors´	   purchases	   and	   sales	   in	   the	  Foreign	  Exchange	  (FX)	   futures	  market.	   	   In	   the	  Brazilian	  case	  rising	  commodity	  prices	  also	  fostered	   the	   currency	   appreciation	   in	   an	   indirect	   way-­‐-­‐	   investors´	   bets	   through	   FX	  derivatives	   contracts.	   Moreover,	   these	   bets	   were	   supported	   by	   the	   huge	   interest	   rate	  differential	  (due	  to	  the	  high	  policy	  rate	  in	  Brazil)	  in	  a	  context	  of	  risk	  appetite	  and	  searching	  for	  yield	  by	  global	  investors.	  	  Between	   2010	   and	   2012	   concerns	   about	   exchange	   rate	   appreciation,	   de-­‐industrialization,	   and	   financial	   stability	   reached	   a	   tipping	   point	   in	   the	   PT	   government.	  	  	  Against	  many	   odds,	   Brazil	   put	   in	   place	   a	   new	  brand	   of	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   regulations	  that	  were	  a	  modest	  success	  in	  maintaining	  exchange	  rate	  and	  financial	  stability	  during	  this	  turbulent	  period.	  	  	  	   As	  we	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  according	  to	  the	  ‘capital	  mobility	  hypothesis’	  and	  related	   literature	   it	   should	   be	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   an	   emerging	   market	   economy	   to	  reregulate	   cross-­‐border	   finance	   after	   it	   had	   opened	   its	   capital	   account.	   	   Interest	   group	  pressure,	   institutional	   obstacles,	   and	   the	   sheer	   power	   of	   global	   capital	   markets	   are	   all	  factors	  that	  would	  deem	  such	  an	  effort	  as	  insurmountable.	  	  	  Brazil	  was	  able	  to	  beat	  these	  odds,	  though	  likely	  not	  in	  a	  manner	  adequate	  enough	  to	  address	   the	   financialization	  of	   the	   resource	  curse.	   	  Based	  on	   the	  analyses	   in	   this	  paper	  there	  were	  at	  least	  four	  key	  factors	  that	  enabled	  Brazil	  to	  exert	  countervailing	  power	  over	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  global	  markets	  as	  articulated	  in	  the	  ‘capital	  mobility	  hypothesis’.	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  Brazil	  has	  unique	  institutions	  that	  allow	  financial	  regulators	  to	  act	  in	  a	  timely	  and	  
counter-­‐cyclical	  manner.	  	  	  	   	  As	   noted	   earlier	   in	   the	   paper	   it	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   the	   government	   to	   take	  away	  the	  punch	  bowl	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  party.	  	  The	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  of	  surges	  of	  cross-­‐border	   finance	   are	   associated	  with	   increases	   in	   aggregate	   demand.	   	  Moreover,	   firms	   and	  households	  feel	  richer	  as	  asset	  prices	  rise	  and	  as	  they	  have	  more	  purchasing	  power	  due	  to	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation.	   	  If	  a	  government	  seeks	  to	  regulate	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  at	  this	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time	   they	   face	   steep	   opposition	   as	   all	   the	   forces	   described	   above	   that	   would	   oppose	  regulation	  are	  at	  their	  strongest.	  Brazil	  has	  an	  institutional	  framework	  that	  allows	  financial	  authorities	  (both	  finance	  ministry	  and	  central	  bank)	  to	  act	  quickly	  and	  at	  their	  discretion	  to	  put	  in	  place	  regulations	  in	   a	   counter-­‐cyclical	   manner.	   	   The	   financial	   authorities	   thus	   do	   not	   have	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  legislative	   battle	   during	   a	   boom.	   	   Not	   only	   would	   such	   a	   battle	   be	   difficult	   to	   win,	   but	  legislation	  often	  takes	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time,	  after	  which	  the	  capital	  flows	  cycle	  may	  have	  already	  played	  itself	  out.	  	  	  Having	  legislation	  in	  place	  also	  gives	  a	  government	  the	  institutional	  space	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  increasing	  trend	  in	  central	  bank	  mandates	  of	  inflation	  targeting	  and	  price	  stability.	  	  Finance	  ministers	  and	  central	  banks,	  if	  they	  see	  it	  prudent	  to	  regulate	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  can	  do	  so	  with	  only	  having	  to	  justify	  their	  actions	  to	  the	  political	  system,	  rather	  than	  go	  through	  a	  full	  on	  legislative	  process.	  	  Finally,	  Brazil	  has	  the	  policy	  space	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  regulation	  given	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  trade	  and	  investment	  treaties,	  or	  commitments	  under	  the	  GATS,	  that	  prohibit	  the	  regulation	  of	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  (Prates	  and	  Paula,	  2013).	  	  
2.	   Brazil’s	   government	   is	   often	   backed	   by	   an	   export	   sector	   that	   is	   more	   concerned	  
about	  the	  exchange	  rate	  than	  about	  their	  access	  to	  global	  finance.	  	   At	   the	   national-­‐level,	   regulations	   on	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   flows	   are	   a	   form	   of	  countervailing	  monetary	  power.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  countervailing	  monetary	  power	  was	  in	  part	  made	  possible	  because	  of	  a	  strong	  export	  sector	  that	  was	  very	  motivated	  by	  the	  need	  to	  limit	   exchange	   rate	   volatility.	   	   This	   concern	   overrode	   the	   traditional	   alliance	   between	  exporters	  and	   the	   financial	   sector	   in	  EMEs	  and	  developing	   countries.	   	  Many	  authors	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  sectors	  with	  the	  closest	  ties	  to	  major	  cross-­‐border	  financial	  actors	  would	  be	  exporters	   of	   tradable	   goods	   and	   thus	  would	   be	   less	   apt	   to	   bite	   the	   hand	   that	   feeds	   them	  through	   regulating	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   actors	   (Freiden,	   1991,	   Leiteritz,	   2012).	   	   It	   has	  been	   noted,	   however,	   that	   sometimes	   those	   actors	   have	   divergent	   interests	   because	  exporters	   are	   hurt	   by	   exchange	   rate	   appreciation	   while	   finance	   benefits	   from	   inflows	  (Frieden,	  1991).	  	  	  In	  Brazil,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  the	  export	  sector	  is	  not	  as	  interconnected	  with	  the	  global	   financial	   sector	  as	   in	  many	  other	   countries.	   	  BNDES	  and	  BB	  provide	   significant	  levels	   of	   finance	   to	   Brazilian	   exporters	   out	   of	   earmarked	   resources	  with	   favorable	   terms	  (lower	   interest	   rates	   and	   longer	   terms).	   	   The	   Brazilian	   industrial	   export	   sector	  was	   thus	  very	   concerned	   about	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	   provided	   a	   well-­‐organized	   constituency	  rallying	  for	  government	  policy	  change.	  	  	  	  
3.	   Brazil	   was	   more	   likely	   have	   the	   political	   power	   to	   regulate	   cross-­‐border	   finance	  
because	  the	  prevailing	  party	  and	  government	  is	  backed	  by	  workers	  that	  are	  concerned	  
about	   job	  security	  than	  the	  consumption	  benefits	   that	  come	  with	  appreciation	   in	  the	  
midst	  of	  acute	  volatility.	  As	   consumers,	   workers	   may	   be	   less	   apt	   to	   support	   regulation	   that	   would	   reduce	  upward	   pressure	   on	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	   asset	   prices.	   	   Currency	   appreciation	   allows	  workers	  to	  purchase	  more	  goods	  and	  asset	  bubbles	  allow	  them	  to	  feel	  more	  wealthy	  as	  well.	  
	   4	  
However,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   Brazil	   highlighted,	   maintaining	   job	   security	   can	   override	  these	   more	   short-­‐term	   concerns.	   	   The	   most	   organized	   workers	   in	   Brazil	   are	   in	   export	  industrial	   sectors.	   	   These	   workers	   also	   form	   a	   formidable	   component	   of	   the	   Brazilian	  Worker’s	  Party	   (PT)that	  was	   in	  power	  during	   the	  entire	  period	   that	  capital	   controls	  were	  put	   in	  place	   in	   this	   study.	   	  When	   the	  domestic	   currency	  appreciated	   in	  Brazil	  many	   firms	  began	   to	   lose	   their	   competitiveness	   and	   shed	   jobs	   and	   thus	   deviated	   from	   one	   of	   the	  fundamental	   tenets	  of	   the	  PT	  government.	   	  Regulating	   capital	   flows	  and	   foreign	  exchange	  derivatives	   became	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   job	   security	   package	   and	   had	   strong	   backing	   from	  workers.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  implicit	  alliance	  between	  the	  export	  sector	  and	  their	  workers	  gave	  the	  PT	  very	  strong	  backing.	  	  Governments	  can	  also	  evoke	  past	  crises	  to	  gain	  further	  support.	  
	  
4.	  Brazil	  re-­‐framed	  regulations	  in	  the	  new	  welfare	  economics	  of	  capital	  controls.	  The	   new	  welfare	   economics	   and	   related	   thinking	   about	   capital	   controls	   caught	   on	   and	   is	  linked	   to	   the	   “macroprudentializing”	   of	   post-­‐crisis	   regulation	   that	   has	   occurred	   since	   the	  crisis.	   	  Baker	   (2013)	  sees	  macroprudential	   tools	  as	  spreading	   like	  wildfire	  since	   the	  crisis	  for	  four	  reasons	  or	  “Ps”:	  P1	  .	  presence	  –	  the	  prior	  intellectual	  and	  institutional	  presence	  of	  ideas;	  	  P2.	   professional	   positioning	   –	   advocates	   of	   ideas	   becoming	   better	   positioned	   in	  professional	  policy	  networks;	  	  P3.	  promotion	  and	  persuasion	  –	  individual	  insiders	  (norm	  entrepreneurs)	  willingly	  engaging	   in	   networking	   and	   persuasion	   strategies,	   actively	   promoting	   ideas	  when	  the	  opportunity	  arose;	  and	  	  P4.	  plausibility	  –	  a	  seeming	  increase	  in	  the	  explanatory	  capacity	  of	  those	  ideas	  based	  on	   their	   diagnosis	   of	   the	   situation	   and	   their	   advocacy	   of	   a	   feasible	   programme	   of	  action	  that	  could	  be	  accepted	  by	  a	  range	  of	  relevant	  actors,	  together	  with	  the	  rising	  professional	  esteem,	  status	  and	  standing	  of	   the	  advocates	  of	   those	   ideas,	  based	  on	  their	  prior	  analytical	  performance,	  which	  increased	  the	  plausibility,	  both	  of	  them	  as	  individuals	  and	  the	  ideas	  they	  were	  advocating	  (Baker,	  2013,	  114).	  In	   Brazil	   the	   new	   economics	   of	   capital	   controls	   	   and	   the	   new	   terminology	   of	  ‘macroprudential	  measures’	  were	  cloaked	  to	  help	  convince	  or	  calm	  potential	  opponents.	  	  In	  Brazil,	   the	   finance	  ministry	   re-­‐framed	   the	   rationale	   for	   regulating	   cross-­‐border	   finance	  as	  the	  need	  to	  ‘internalize	  an	  externality’	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  central	  bank	  backing	  for	  regulation.	  	  	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  with	  this	  new	  approach	  in	  Brazil,	  reregulation	  was	  not	  a	  return	  to	  a	  completely	   closed	   capital	   account.	   	   Indeed	   such	   an	   approach	   is	   impossible	   and	   arguably	  undesirable.	  	  What	  we	  see	  in	  this	  area	  of	  economic	  policy	  is	  analogous	  to	  what	  Lazzarni	  and	  Musacchio	   (chapter	  X)	  discuss	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   role	  of	   the	  PT	   in	   industrial	  policy—the	  state	  becomes	  a	  minority	  stakeholder	  that	  tries	  to	  set	  goal	  posts	  and	  use	  the	  state	  to	  govern	  the	  financial	  cycles	  within	  the	  economy.	  	  	  	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   Section	   two	   discusses	   the	  relationship	   between	   cross-­‐border	   finance	   and	   exchange	   rate	   instability	   in	   emerging	  markets	   from	  both	  an	  economic	  and	  a	  political	  economy	  perspective.	   In	  the	  following	  two	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sections,	  the	  Brazilian	  case	  is	  analyzed	  out	  of	  these	  two	  perspectives	  (economic	  in	  section	  3	  and	  political	  economy	  in	  section	  4).	  The	  paper	  ends	  with	  a	  brief	  conclusion.	  	  	  
2.	   Cross-­‐border	   finance	   and	   Exchange	   Rate	   Instability	   in	   Emerging	   Markets	  
Economies	  In	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   there	   has	   been	   a	   resurgence	   of	   theoretical	   and	  economic	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   flows	   and	   economic	   development.	  	  Such	  work	  has	  triggered	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  and	  a	  recognition	  that	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  has	  to	  be	  regulated	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  stable	  financial	  system	  that	  channels	  finance	  toward	  productive	  uses	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  	   	  For	  years,	  treatment	  about	  financial	  instability	  due	  to	  cross-­‐border	  capital	  flows	  was	  relegated	   to	   the	   Post-­‐Keynesian	   literature,	   but	   has	   gone	   mainstream	   given	   new	  developments	   in	   theory	  since	   the	   turn	  of	   the	  century.	   	  The	  Post	  Keynesian	   literature	  (e.g.,	  Schulmeister,	  1988;	  Davidson,	  1998,	  2000;	  Dow,	  1999;	  Grabel,	  1996,	  1999;	  Harvey,	  1991,	  1999	  e	  2009)	  highlighted	  that	  in	  the	  post-­‐Bretton	  woods	  era	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  and	  free	   capital	  mobility,	   short-­‐term	   capital	   flows	   (portfolio	   investment	   and	   short	   term	   bank	  loans)	  constitute	  the	  chief	  determinant	  of	  nominal	  exchange	  rates,	  which	  are	  highly	  volatile.	  The	   very	   instability	   and	   the	   speculative	   logic	   of	   these	   flows,	   subordinate	   to	   financial	  investors’	   risk	   aversion/appetite,	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   the	   volatility	   of	   exchange	  rates	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	   	   In	  this	  specific	  historic	  setting,	  national	  central	  banks	   have	   been	   called	   to	   intervene	   in	   currency	  markets	   to	   curb	   volatility,	   undermining	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy.	  	  This	  perspective	  has	  also	  been	  recently	  upheld	  in	  mainstream	  economics.	  Rey	  (2013)	  found	  that	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  constitutes	  a	   ‘global	   financial	  cycle’,	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  two	   dynamically	   linked	   variables:	   the	   VIX	   (a	   measure	   of	   investor´s	   risk	   aversion)	   and	  monetary	   policy	   (Fed	   Fund	   Rate	   level)	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   Monetary	   conditions	   of	   the	  centre	   country	   influence	   global	   bank	   leverage,	   credit	   flows	   and	   credit	   growth	   in	   the	  international	  financial	  system	  that	  are	  transmitted	  world-­‐wide	  through	  cross-­‐border	  credit	  flows.	   Therefore,	   as	   Rey	   has	   stressed,	   this	   channel	   challenges	   the	   traditional	   “trilemma”	  view	  of	  the	  open	  economy	  (also	  called	  “impossible	  trinity”),	  upon	  which	  in	  a	  world	  of	  free	  capital	  mobility,	   independent	  monetary	  policies	  are	   feasible	   if	  exchange	  rates	  are	   floating.	  Instead,	  monetary	  conditions	  are	  transmitted	  from	  the	  main	  financial	  centre	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  through	  gross	  credit	  flows	  and	  leverage,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  regime.	  In	   the	   author’s	   words:	   “Fluctuating	   exchange	   rates	   cannot	   insulate	   economies	   from	   the	  global	   financial	   cycle,	  when	   capital	   is	  mobile.	   The	   “trilemma”	  morphs	   into	   a	   “dilemma”	   –	  independent	  monetary	  policies	   are	  possible	   if	   and	  only	   if	   the	   capital	   account	   is	  managed,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  regardless	  of	  the	  exchange-­‐rate	  regime”	  (p.	  21).	  Yet,	  the	  instability	  of	  capital	  flows	  is	  higher	  in	  EMEs	  than	  advanced	  ones.	  As	  a	  result,	  their	   exchange	   rates	   are	  more	   volatile	   (Andrade	   and	   Prates,	   2013),	   requiring	   permanent	  official	  interventions	  in	  the	  currency	  markets	  (the	  so-­‐called	  “fear	  of	  floating”,	  e.g	  Calvo	  and	  Reinhart,	   2002)	  which	   reinforce	   the	   interaction	   between	   exchange	   and	   policy	   rates.	   This	  means	  that	  EMEs	  face	  an	  even	  bigger	  dilemma	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  monetary	  autonomy	  under	  free	  capital	  mobility	  is	  greater	  than	  in	  advanced	  economies.	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The	   fact	   that	   capital	   flows	   to	   EMEs	   are	  more	   fickle	   has	   also	   become	  mainstream.	  Under	  the	  ‘new	  welfare	  economics	  ‘of	  capital	  controls,	  unstable	  capital	  flows	  to	  EMEs	  can	  be	  viewed	   as	   negative	   externalities	   on	   recipient	   countries.	   Therefore	   regulations	   on	   cross-­‐border	   capital	   flows	   are	   tools	   to	   correct	   for	  market	   failures	   that	   can	  make	  markets	  work	  better	  and	  enhance	  growth,	  not	  worsen	  it.	  	  This	  work	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  Anton	  Korinek	  (2011)	  and	  others	  in	  the	  IMF	  Economic	  Review	  and	  other	  venues.	  According	  to	  this	  research,	  externalities	  are	  generated	  by	  capital	  flows	  because	  individual	  investors	  and	  borrowers	  do	  not	   know	   (or	   ignore)	   what	   the	   effects	   of	   their	   financial	   decisions	   will	   be	   on	   the	   level	   of	  financial	  stability	   in	  a	  particular	  nation.	  A	  better	  analogy	  than	  protectionism	  would	  be	  the	  case	  of	  an	  individual	  firm	  not	  incorporating	  its	  contribution	  to	  urban	  air	  pollution.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pollution	  the	  polluting	  firm	  can	  accentuate	  the	  environmental	  harm	  done	  by	  its	   activity,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   capital	   flows	  a	   foreign	   investor	  might	   tip	   a	  nation	   into	   financial	  difficulties	  and	  even	  a	  financial	  crisis.	  This	  is	  a	  classic	  market	  failure	  argument	  and	  calls	  for	  what	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   Pigouvian	   tax	   that	   will	   correct	   for	   the	  market	   failure	   and	  make	  markets	  work	  more	  efficiently.	  	  	   On	   the	   empirical	   front,	   the	   literature	   now	   demonstrates	   that	   capita	   account	  liberalization	   is	   not	   strongly	   associated	   with	   growth	   and	   stability.	   	   Jeanne	   et	   al,	   (2013)	  conduct	  a	  sweeping	  ‘meta-­‐regression’	  of	  the	  entire	  literature	  that	  includes	  2,340	  regression	  results	   and	   find	   little	   correlation	   between	   capital	   account	   liberalization	   and	   economic	  growth.	   	  They	  conclude:	   	  “the	  international	  community	  should	  not	  seek	  to	  promote	  totally	  free	   trade	   in	   assets—even	   over	   the	   long	   run—because	   free	  capital	  mobility	   seems	   to	  have	  
little	  benefit	   in	   terms	  of	   long	  run	  growth	   and	   because	   there	   is	   a	   good	   case	   to	   be	  made	   for	  prudential	   and	   non-­‐distortive	   capital	   controls	   “(Jeanne	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   5).	   Moreover,	  considerable	  work	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  probability	   of	   financial	   crises.	   	   Reinhardt	   and	  Rogoff	   (2010)	   show	   that	   since	  1800	  capital	  mobility	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  banking	  crises.	  	  	  There	   is	  also	  now	  strong	  evidence	   that	  capital	   controls	  can	  help	  manage	  exchange	  rate	  volatility	  and	  financial	  fragility.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  these	  theoretical	  breakthroughs,	  a	  consensus	   is	   emerging	   on	   the	   efficacy	   of	   capital	   account	   regulations.	   	   	   The	   majority	   of	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  capital	  account	  regulations	  deployed	  in	  the	  period	  from	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  until	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  met	  many	  of	  their	  stated	  goals.	  	  In	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  review	  of	   the	   literature,	  Magud,	  Reinhart,	  and	  Rogoff	   (2011)	  analyze	  studies	  on	  controls	  on	   inflows	  and	  outflows,	  as	  well	  as	  multi-­‐country	  studies.	  The	  authors	  conclude	   that	   “in	   sum,	   capital	   controls	   on	   inflows	   seem	   to	   make	   monetary	   policy	   more	  independent,	   alter	   the	   composition	   of	   capital	   flows,	   and	   reduce	   real	   exchange	   rate	  pressures”.	   	  There	  are	   fewer	   studies	  on	  outflows,	   comprising	  mostly	   studies	  of	  Malaysia’s	  1998	  outflows	   restrictions.	   	   In	  Malaysia,	   the	  authors	   found	  controls	   “reduce	  outflows	  and	  may	  make	  room	  for	  more	  independent	  monetary	  policy.”	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  Ostry	  et	  al	  (2010)	  further	  confirmed	  this	  literature	  when	  finding	  that	  those	  countries	  that	  had	  deployed	  capital	  controls	  on	  inflows	  were	  among	  the	  world’s	  least	  hard	  hit	  during	  the	  crisis.	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In	  the	  economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  experience	  (section	  3),	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  and	  the	  exchange	  rate	  regime1,	  which	  shapes	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  (relative	  price	  of	  currencies)	  under	  the	  dirty	  floating	  regime	  in	  force	  since	  January	  1999.	  This	  dynamic,	  in	  turn,	  along	  with	  domestic	  and	  external	  price	  inflation,	  determines	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  real	  effective	  exchange	  rate	  (relative	  price	  of	  external	   and	   internal	   goods),	   one	   of	   the	  main	   determining	   factors	   of	   a	   country´s	   external	  competitiveness.	  Many	   mutually	   reinforcing	   monetary	   and	   financial	   asymmetries	   underlie	  macroeconomic	  challenges	  faced	  by	  Brazil	  and	  other	  EMEs	  in	  a	  context	  of	  free	  cross-­‐border	  finance.	   On	   one	   hand,	   their	   currencies,	   at	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   currency	   hierarchy,	   are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  inherent	  volatility	  of	  capital	   flows,	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  an	   exogenous	   process	   (the	   global	   financial	   cycle	   coined	   by	   Rey	   and	   mentioned	   above).	  Consequently,	   their	   exchange	   rates	   are	   more	   volatile.	   In	   turn,	   the	   greater	   exchange	   rate	  volatility	   has	  more	   harmful	   effects	   than	   in	   AEs	   exactly	   because	   EMEs	   currencies	   are	   not	  international	   currencies.	   	   This	   fact	   increases	   the	   risk	   of	   financial	   fragility	   (due	   to	   the	  potential	   currency	  mismatches)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   pass-­‐through	   of	   exchange	   rate	   changes	   to	  domestic	   prices.	   The	   higher	   pass-­‐through	   takes	   place	   because	   the	   current	   and	   expected	  behavior	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  (the	  price	  of	  the	  foreign	  currency	  in	  this	  economies)	  is	  a	  key	  parameters	  of	  corporations´	  price	  setting	  in	  face	  of	  the	  non-­‐international	  character	  of	  their	  currencies2.	   On	   other	   hand,	   they	   also	   result	   in	   different	   degrees	   of	   monetary	   policy	  autonomy	  in	  EMEs	  and	  AEs.	  	  As	  Ocampo	  (2001b,	  p.10)	  pointed	  out:	  “whereas	  the	  center	  has	  more	   policy	   autonomy	   and	   is	   thus	   “policy	  making”	   -­‐	   certainly	   with	   significant	   variations	  among	   the	   different	   economies	   involved	   -­‐,	   the	   periphery	   is	   essentially	   “policy	   taking”.	   In	  other	   words,	   the	   monetary	   and	   financial	   asymmetries	   result	   in	   a	   macroeconomic	  asymmetry:	  the	  dilemma	  or	  impossible	  duality	  is	  greater	  in	  EMEs	  because	  their	  position	  in	  the	   IMFS	   strengthens	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   policy	   rate	   and	   the	   nominal	   exchange	  rate	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  global	  investors’	  portfolio	  decisions	  on	  these	  key	  macroeconomic	  prices.	  	  	  
Political	  Economy	  of	  Cross-­‐Border	  Finance	  and	  Exchange	  Rate	  Volatility	  The	  broad	  literature	  in	  political	  economy	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  increasing	  level	  and	  sophistication	  of	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  makes	  it	  harder	  for	  the	  nation	  state	  to	  devise	  policies	  to	   manage	   those	   capital	   flows	   and	   their	   subsequent	   impacts	   on	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	  financial	  stability.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  regime	  refers	  to	  the	  method	  of	  determining	  the	  nominal	  exchange	  rate,	  encompassing	  an	  entire	  
continuum	  that	  can	  be	  arrayed	  from	  most	  flexible	  to	  most	  rigidly	  fixed	  (Frankel,	  2003).	  	  	  
2	  Many	  studies	  show	  that	  this	  pass-­‐through	  is	  greater	  in	  EMEs	  than	  AEs	  (Greenville,	  2000;	  Mohanty	  &	  
Scatigna,	  2005;	  Ho	  and	  McCauley,	  2003).	  Yet,	  the	  main	  explanation	  put	  forward	  by	  them	  is	  the	  different	  
composition	  of	  their	  price	  indexes	  (due	  to	  the	  different	  consumption	  basket):	  the	  higher	  pass-­‐through	  in	  
EMEs	  is	  due	  to	  the	  higher	  share	  of	  basic	  goods,	  which	  prices	  are	  set	  in	  the	  international	  market,	  in	  the	  
consumption	  basket.	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The	  prevailing	  view	  that	  explains	  how	  capital	  accounts	  became	  liberalized	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years	  is	  that	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  has	  became	  so	  immense	  and	  sophisticated	  that	  they	   were	   virtually	   impossible	   for	   nation-­‐states	   to	   regulate.	   	   The	   sheer	   power	   of	   the	  markets	   themselves,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	   foreign	  and	  domestic	   investors	   to	  have	  veto-­‐power	  over	  national	  regulation	  by	  threatening	  to	  withdraw	  their	  capital,	  eventually	  tilted	  national	  institutions	   and	   ideologies	   to	   shift	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   free	  mobility	   of	   finance	   as	  well	   (Block,	  1977).	  	  Those	  sectors	  that	  benefited	  the	  most	  from	  foreign	  financial	  flows	  became	  relatively	  stronger	   and	   supported	   political	   parties	   that	   in	   turn	   supported	   the	   de-­‐regulation	   of	   the	  capital	   account	   as	  well.	   	  Moreover,	   free	   flowing	   capital	   had	   become	   the	   dominant	  way	   of	  thinking	  within	  the	  economics	  profession	  and	  thus	  permeated	  the	  central	  banks	  and	  finance	  ministries	   the	   world	   over.	   Finally,	   these	   actions	   became	   supported	   and	   sometimes	  conditioned	  upon	  good	   relations	  with	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  and	   the	   international	  financial	  institutions	  where	  they	  held	  the	  most	  voting	  power.	  	  	  	   Put	  more	  formally,	  the	  prevailing	  view	  is	  of	  a	  ‘capital	  mobility	  hypothesis’	  where	  in	  a	  world	   of	   high	   capital	   mobility	   “policy	   options	   available	   to	   states	   are	   systematically	  circumscribed”	  because	  of	   the	  structural	  power	  of	  global	  capital	  markets	  (Andrews,	  1994,	  193).	  	  Goodman	  and	  Pauly	  (1993)	  and	  Cohen	  (1998,	  132)	  reinforce	  this	  notion	  by	  showing	  how	  capital	  mobility	  empowers	  those	  actors	  that	  stand	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  from	  deregulating	  capital	   account	   regulations,	   by	   providing	   more	   leverage	   for	   private	   interests	   over	  government	   regulators.	   	   Evoking	  Hirschman	   (1970),	   Cohen	   argues	   that	   private	   finance	   is	  empowered	   with	   “Exit,	   voice,	   and	   loyalty.”	   	   Private	   finance	   becomes	   more	   equipped	   to	  circumvent	   capital	   account	   regulations,	   thus	   giving	   less	   loyalty	   to	   government	   regulators.	  	  They	   have	   the	   leverage	   of	   “exit”	   or	   capital	   flight	   and	   thus	   their	   voice	   becomes	   more	  accentuated	   in	   the	  political	  process.	   	   In	   some	  sense,	   capital	  mobility	   gives	  private	   finance	  veto	  power	  on	  public	  policy	  to	  manage	  capital	  flows.	  	  Mosley	  (2003)	  shows	  that	  such	  power	  has	   its	   limits	   in	   developed	   countries	   but	   is	   stronger	   in	   developing	   countries	   because	  investors	  are	  more	  concerned	  about	  default	  and	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  global	  markets	  over	  smaller	  and	  weaker	  states.	  	  	   Frieden	  (1991)	  and	  Leiteritz	  (2012)	  extend	  this	  logic	  to	  the	  case	  of	  emerging	  markets	  in	   separate	   studies	   on	   Latin	   America.	   	   The	   sectors	   with	   the	   closest	   ties	   to	   major	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   actors	   would	   be	   exporters	   of	   tradable	   goods	   and	   the	   foreign	   financial	  sector.	   	   Sometimes	   those	   actors	   have	   divergent	   interests	   because	   exporters	   are	   hurt	   by	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation	  while	  finance	  benefits	  from	  inflows	  (Frieden,	  1991).	   	  However,	  big	  exporters	  often	  rely	  on	  foreign	  credit	  markets	  and	  thus	  exert	  pressure	  against	  measures	  to	   regulate	   such	   financial	   flows	   and	   thus	   usually	   push	   for	   capital	   account	   liberalization	  (Leiteritz,	  2012).	  	  	   Henning	   (1994)	   adds	   that	   institutional	   arrangements	   play	   a	   role	   as	   well.	   	   In	   an	  examination	   of	   Germany,	   Japan,	   and	   the	  United	   States	   he	   found	   that	   those	   countries	   that	  relaxed	   regulations	   on	   capital	   account	   and	   exchange	   rates	   often	   had	   highly	   independent	  central	  banks	  and	  a	  weak	  industry-­‐financial	  alliance,	  whereas	  countries	  that	  were	  more	  apt	  to	   intervene	   had	   a	   subordinate	   central	   bank	   and	   a	   strong	   alliance	   between	   finance	   and	  industry—with	   finance-­‐industry	   lobbies	   putting	   pressure	   on	   the	   finance	   ministry	   to	  intervene.	  	  	  	   These	  interest	  groups	  support	  right-­‐of-­‐center	  political	  parties	  that	  seek	  to	  de-­‐regulate	  the	  capital	  account	  through	  dismantling	  previous	  regulations	  and	  institutions.	  	  Kastner	  and	  Rector	   (2003)	   show	  how	   right-­‐of-­‐center	   parties	   played	   a	   large	   role	   in	   liberalizing	   capital	  accounts	   in	   19	   developed	   countries	   over	   the	   period	   1951	   to	   1998.	   Garret	   	   (1995)	   shows	  
	   9	  
that	  global	  capital	  mobility	  still	  leaves	  room	  for	  left-­‐of-­‐center	  governments	  to	  maneuver	  but	  those	   governments	   are	   penalized	   through	   higher	   interest	   rates	   than	   their	   right	   wing	  counterparts.	  	  Right-­‐of-­‐center	  governing	  parties	  are	  often	  advised	  by	  experts	  trained	  in	  the	  New	  Classical	   tradition	   (Haggard	  and	  Maxfield,	  1996;	  Blyth,	  2002;	  Kirshner,	  2005).	  These	  governments	  appoint	  economists	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  that	  hold	  such	  views	  into	  central	  banks	  and	  finance	  ministries	  Fourcade	  (2006).	  	   These	  factors	  are	  reinforced	  by	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  and	  by	  Western	  governments.	   	   Joyce	   and	  Noy	   (2008)	   found	   that	   the	   IMF	   implicitly	   linked	   capital	   account	  liberalization	  with	   its	   country	  programs.	   	  Abdelal	   (2007)	   shows	   that	   the	  OECD	  codes	  and	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  also	  penalized	  nations	  for	  regulating	  capital	  flows.	  	  The	  United	  States	  government	   has	   also	   long	   pushed	   for	   capital	   account	   liberalization	   (Wade	   and	   Veneroso,	  1998;	  Cohen,	  2007).	  	   Moreover,	   Gallagher	   (2014)	   has	   argued	   that	   cross-­‐border	   finance	   is	   inherently	   pro-­‐cyclical	   in	   emerging	   markets	   and	   susceptible	   to	   large	   surges	   and	   sudden	   stops.	   	   When	  talking	  with	  policy-­‐makers	  who	  attempted	  to	  put	   in	  place	  capital	  account	  regulations	  they	  confirmed	   that	   many	   of	   the	   forces	   previously	   identified	   in	   the	   literature	   are	   dominant.	  	  However	  they	  emphasized	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  of	  those	  forces	  are	  most	  powerful	  at	  exactly	  the	  time	  when	  regulation	   is	  needed	  most—the	  surge.	   	  However,	  a	   surge	   is	   initially	  associated	  with	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation,	  asset	  price	  increases,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  GDP.	  	  Thus	  firms,	  workers,	   and	   households	   can	   purchase	   more	   goods	   and	   services	   during	   a	   surge,	   feel	  wealthier	  due	  to	  asset	  price	  increases,	  and	  see	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  growing.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  regulation	  during	  the	  surge	  those	  that	  believe	  that	  regulation	  is	  not	  optimal	  policy	  argue	  that	   their	   observations	   prevail.	   	   One	   regulator	   communicated	   that	   ‘it	   is	   hard	   to	   take	   the	  punch	  bowl	  away	  when	  the	  party	  is	  just	  getting	  fun!”	  	  New	  research	  on	  the	  United	  States	  has	  pointed	  out	  similar	  dynamics.	   	   In	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  political	  economy	  of	   the	  United	  States	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008,	  McCarty,	  Poole,	  and	  Rosenthal	  (2013)	  show	  that	   financial	   bubbles	   were	   associated	   with	   a	   ‘political	   bubble’	   that	   are	   also	   pro-­‐cyclical.	  	  	  During	  booms	  the	  beliefs	  of	   investors	  think	  that	   ‘this	  time	  is	  different’	  and	  that	  prices	  and	  prospects	  will	  continue	  to	  increase.	   	   	  These	  authors	  show	  that	  political	  actors	  also	  take	  on	  those	  beliefs	  and	  are	  thus	  reluctant	  to	  act	  during	  a	  boom.	  	  	  Indeed,	  during	  booms	  then	  more	  new	  politicians	  with	  ideologies	  that	  do	  not	  support	  regulation	  come	  into	  power.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  financial	  sector	  itself	  also	  becomes	  stronger	  during	  the	  boom,	  and	  supports	  politicians	  with	  views	  against	  financial	  regulation.	  	  This	  integration	  of	  forces	  has	  largely	  explained	  why	  virtually	  all	  developed	  countries	  and	  many	  EMDs	   liberalized	   their	   capital	   accounts	  during	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	   twentieth	  century	  and	  tend	  not	  to	  manage	  those	   flows	  or	  make	  major	   interventions	   in	  the	  exchange	  rate.	  	  	  
	  
3.	  Cross-­‐Border	  Financial	  Flows	  and	  Exchange	  Rate	  Stability	  in	  Brazil	  Like	  most	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  and	  many	  other	  EMEs,	  Brazil	  has	  floated	  its	  exchange	  rate	  and	  opened	  its	  capital	  account.	  	  Unlike	  many	  other	  EMEs	  however,	  Brazil	  put	  in	  place	  three	  key	  institutional	  features	  that	  grant	  Brazil	  the	  flexibility	  to	  manage	  cross-­‐border	   financial	   flows	   and	  monitor	   the	   exchange	   rate	   in	  ways	   that	   other	   nations	   cannot.	  	  These	  three	  features	  are:	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  allows	  for	  counter-­‐cyclical	  taxation	  of	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   activity;	   a	   special	   counsel	   that	   puts	   the	   finance	   and	   planning	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ministries	  on	  equal	  footing	  with	  the	  central	  bank	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  and	  exchange	  rate	  management;	  and	  a	  policy	  not	  to	  sign	  trade	  and	  investment	  treaties	  that	  prohibit	   the	   use	   of	   these	   measures.	   	   These	   institutional	   factors,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   other	  factors	  detailed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  allowed	  Brazil	  to	  take	  a	  more	  active	  stance	  on	  exchange	  rate	  management	  than	  many	  of	  its	  counterparts	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	   	  especially	  over	  2010-­‐2012.	  	  	  	  	   During	   the	   neoliberal	   1990s	   Brazil	   took	   numerous	   measures	   to	   open	   the	   capital	  account	   and	   adopt	   a	  macroeconomic	   regime	   featured	   by	   a	   floating	   exchange	   rate	   and	   an	  inflation	   target	   policy.	   	   Paula	   (2011)	   provides	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   analysis	   of	   that	  period	  in	  English	  and	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  review	  that	  entire	  experience.	  	  We	   focus	   on	   the	   period	   beginning	   in	   2003.	   Lula	   da	   Silva’s	   (hereafter	   Lula)	   economic	  policies,	  beginning	  in	  January	  2003,	  were	  marked	  by	  the	  continuity	  of	  this	  economic	  policy	  framework.	   	   The	  Brazilian	   economy	  became	   fully	   open	   to	   capital	   inflows	   and	   outflows	   in	  2005,	   when	   residents'	   capital	   exports	   were	   fully	   liberalized.	   Another	   important	  measure	  was	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   income	   tax	   on	   returns	   of	   government	   bonds	   owned	   by	   foreign	  investors	  in	  February	  2006.	  In	   contrast	   with	   the	   period	   of	   1999-­‐2002	   (Fernando	   Henrique	   Cardoso´s	   second	  term),	  this	  framework	  was	  implemented	  in	  an	  exceptionally	  favorable	  international	  context,	  featured	   by	   rising	   commodity	   prices	   and	   a	   boom	   of	   capital	   flows	   to	   emerging	   countries	  (Ocampo,	  2007).	  In	  this	  setting,	  opting	  for	  a	  tight	  monetary	  policy	  (which	  maintained	  a	  high	  interest	   rate	   differential)	   	   ensured	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   inflation	   targeting	   policy	   but	  forced	   the	  monetary	   authorities	   to	   abandon	   any	   kind	   of	   target	   for	   the	   nominal	   exchange	  rate.	  In	  this	  period,	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  inflation	  targeting	  policy,	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  free	  cross-­‐border	  finance,	  was	  an	  appreciation	  trend	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  currency	  (both	   in	   nominal	   and	   real	   terms)	   along	   with	   a	   buildup	   of	   international	   reserves	   which	  aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   country’s	   external	   position.	   	   This	   “precautionary	  demand”	   for	  reserves	   (Aizenman	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Carvalho,	   2010;	   Dooley	   et	   al.,	   2005)	   resulted	   in	   an	  excessively	   high	   cost	   of	   sterilization	   operations	   due	   to	   the	   large	   differential	   between	  internal	  and	  external	  interest	  rates	  (Prates,	  Cunha,	  and	  Lélis	  2009).	  	  A	   Brazil-­‐specific	   feature	   of	   the	   currency	   market	   has	   reinforced	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   policy	   rate	   and	   the	   nominal	   exchange	   rate,	   namely,	   the	   central	   role	   of	   the	  foreign	   exchange	   futures	   market	   	   (i.e.,	   the	   organized	   segment	   in	   the	   foreign	   exchange	  derivatives	  markets)	   in	   BRL/USD	   (Kaltenbrunner,	   2010;	   Chamon	   and	   Garcia,	   2013;	   Fritz	  and	   Prates,	   2014).	   This	   central	   role	   stems	   from	   the	   greater	   liquidity	   and	   deepness	   (i.e,	  higher	   number	   of	   trades	   and	   turnover)	   of	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   futures	   market	   in	  comparison	   with	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   spot	   market.	   	   As	   Garcia	   and	   Urban	   (2004)	   and	  Ventura	  and	  Garcia	  (2012)	  uphold,	  due	  to	  its	  higher	  liquidity,	  the	  first	  dollar	  future	  contract	  has	   become	   the	   locus	   of	   formation	   of	   the	  BRL/USD	   exchange	   rate.	   This	   same	   feature	   has	  resulted	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   financialization	   of	   the	   resource	   curse,	   which	   has	   also	  reinforced	  the	  relationship	  between	  commodity	  prices	  and	  the	  nominal	  exchange	  rate.	  	  This	  specific	  feature	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  currency	  market,	  in	  turn,	  has	  been	  determined	  by	   the	   interaction	   of	   three	   factors,	   which	   reinforce	   each	   other.	   First,	   the	   institutional	  framework	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   currency	   market,	   wherein	   foreign	   currency	   accounts	   (bank	  deposits)	  are	  prohibited,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  exceptions.	  Consequently,	  non-­‐bank	  residents	  and	  non-­‐residents	   can’t	   hold	   foreign	   exchange	   spot	   positions	   (positions	   in	   USD).	   Only	   banks	  authorized	  by	  the	  BCB	  to	  have	  foreign	  exchange	  portfolios	  can	  hold	  these	  positions	  as	  they	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have	  access	  to	  short	  term	  external	  credit	  lines	  in	  the	  international	  interbank	  market	  (called	  clean	   lines,	  which	  are	  not	  recorded	  in	   foreign	  exchange	  contracts).	  This	  same	  institutional	  feature	  underlies	  the	  non-­‐deliverable	  character	  of	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  derivatives	  markets,	  namely,	  gains	  or	  losses	  in	  this	  market	  are	  settled	  in	  domestic	  (BRL)	  and	  not	  in	  the	  foreign	  currency	  (USD).	  Precisely	  because	  these	  operations	  are	  settled	   in	  BRL,	  any	  agent	  can	  hold	  positions	  in	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  futures	  market	  as	  long	  as	  they	  fulfill	  minimum	  standards	  required	   by	   the	   Brazilian	   exchange	   (BM&FBovespa).	   Secondly,	   the	   floating	   exchange	   rate	  regime	  has	  increased	  the	  demand	  for	  foreign	  exchange	  hedge	  and	  the	  opportunities	  to	  earn	  arbitrage	   and	   speculative	   gains	   through	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives.	   Thirdly,	   there	   is	  unrestricted	  access	  to	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  futures	  market	  for	  foreign	  investors.	  It	   is	   worth	  mentioning	   that	   with	   the	   deepening	   of	   financial	   globalization	   and	   the	  increasing	   role	   of	   derivatives	   markets	   since	   de	   1980s,	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	  operations	   has	   begun	   to	   shape	   developed	   countries	   ‘exchange	   rate	   trend	   along	   with	  speculative	  capital	  flows3.	  In	  the	  2000s,	  the	  so-­‐called	  derivatives	  carry	  trade	  has	  had	  a	  key	  role	   in	   the	   behavior	   of	   some	   EMEs´	   currencies,	   including	   the	   Brazilian	   real	   (BRL).	   In	  derivatives	   markets,	   the	   carry	   trade	   expresses	   itself	   as	   a	   bet	   which	   results	   in	   a	   short	  position	   in	   the	   funding	   currency	   and	   a	   long	   position	   in	   the	   target	   currency	   (Gagnon	   and	  Chaboud	  2007).	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  a	  different	  kind	  of	   currency	  speculation	  strategy	   from	  the	  canonical	  carry	  trade	  through	  spot	  market	  operations	  –	  that	  is,	  borrowing	  low-­‐interest-­‐rate	  currencies	   and	   lending	   high-­‐interest-­‐rate	   currencies	   (Burnside	   et	   al.	   2006;	   Gagnon	   and	  Chaboud	  2007;	  Kaltenbrunner	  2010).	  This	  means	  that	  monetary	  conditions	  are	  transmitted	  from	   the	  main	   financial	   centre	   to	   EMEs	   not	   only	   through	   capital	   flows,	   but	   also	   through	  derivatives	   carry	   trade.	   	   In	   the	   case	  of	  Brazil,	   rising	   commodity	  prices	  has	   come	  out	  with	  expectations	  of	  continuing	  currency	  appreciation,	  fostering	  even	  more	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investors´	  long	  positions	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  currency.	  	  Yet,	  during	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  capital	  flows	  to	  emerging	  economies	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	   2008	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   (IMF,	   2011	  ;	   Akyuz,	   2011),	   the	   Brazilian	   government	  gradually	   moved	   towards	   a	   macroeconomic	   strategy	   where	   preventing	   currency	  appreciation	   gained	   relevance	   alongside	   the	   priority	   of	   inflation	   stabilization.	   This	  appreciation	  became	  an	  increasing	  concern	  of	  both	  Lula’s	  and	  later	  Dilma’s	  government	  due	  to	   its	   adverse	   impact	   on	   Brazilian	   industrial	   competitiveness	   which	   has	   faced	   a	   much	  greater	   competition	   both	   in	   the	   international	   and	   domestic	   markets	   in	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  setting.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   untie	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	  policy	   rate	  movements	   and	   achieve	   these	  goals,	  Brazilian	  policy	  markers	   added	  a	  unique	   set	   of	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   regulations	   –	  which	   encompass	   capital	   controls	   (on	   inflows	   and	   outflows)	   and	   financial	   prudential	  regulation	  (Gallagher,	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  and	  Ocampo,	  2012).	  Further,	  due	  to	  the	  key	  role	  of	  the	  FX	   derivatives	   markets	   in	   the	   exchange	   rate	   path,	   these	   regulations	   need	   to	   be	   adopted	  along	   with	   what	   Paula	   and	   Prates	   (2012)	   referred	   to	   as	   “Foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	  regulations”	  which	   apply	   to	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	   operations	   of	   all	   agents,	   be	  they	   nonresidents	   or	   residents,	   financial	   or	   nonfinancial	   actors4.	   Prates	   and	   Fritz	   (2013)	  called	  this	  new	  macroeconomic	  regime	  “dirty	  inflation	  targeting”.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Schulmeister	  (2009).	  
4	  Therefore,	  these	  operations	  are	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  CAR	  inasmuch	  prudential	  financial	  regulation	  
reaches	  only	  financial	  institutions	  and	  capital	  controls	  influence	  cross-­‐border	  transactions	  (Prates,	  2014).	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From	   September	   of	   2009	   through	   much	   of	   2013	   the	   very	   high	   interest	   rate	  differential	   in	   comparison	   other	   emerging	   economies5	  (graph	   2)	   attracted	   searching	   for	  yield	   capital	   flows6	  (see	   Graph	   3)	   and	   derivatives	   carry	   trade	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   futures	  exchange	   (Graphs	   4).	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   foreign	   investors	   again	   made	   one-­‐way	   bets	   on	   the	  appreciation	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   currency	   through	   short	   positions	   in	   the	   foreign	   exchange	  futures	   market	   (selling	   US	   dollars	   and	   buying	   BRL	   -­‐	   (see	   Graph	   4).	   As	   in	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	  period	  (2004	  to	  mid-­‐2008),	   the	  new	  commodity	  price	  boom	  (from	  2009	  to	  mid-­‐2011;	  see	  Unctad,	   2011b)	   had	   stimulated	   these	   bets,	   which	   resulted	   in	   downward	   pressure	   on	   the	  USD	  price	  and,	  thus,	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  BRL	  price	  in	  the	  futures	  market.	  The	  measures	  taken	  by	  Brazil	  to	  curb	  these	  bets	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  1.	  
	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  high	  level	  was	  due	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  policy	  rate	  in	  a	  high	  level	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  EE	  
after	  the	  global	  crisis	  (in	  despite	  of	  its	  reduction	  in	  2009),	  which	  was	  related	  with	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
inflation	  target	  regime,	  as	  Kaltenbrunner	  and	  Paincera	  highlighted	  (2012).	  
6	  Brazil	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  destinations	  of	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  capital	  flows	  to	  emerging	  economies	  
since	  the	  2nd	  quarter	  of	  2009	  (IMF,	  2011a).	  Besides	  the	  huge	  interest	  rate	  differential,	  other	  domestic	  
factors	  stimulated	  these	  flows,	  among	  which	  the	  fast	  economic	  recovery	  after	  the	  contagion-­‐effect	  of	  the	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  Exchange	  Rate	  -­‐ end	  of	  period
Source: Brazilian Central  Bank. Authors´elaboration.
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  Authors´ elaboration.
Brasil Coréia	  do	  Sul Tailândia Turquia Indonésia África	  do	  Sul Mexico Peru












































































































Net	  inflows FDI Portfolio	  investment Other	  investments Financial	  flows
Source: Brazilian	  Central	  Bank.	  Authors´elaboration.
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Graph	  4.	  Investor´s	  net	  positions	  in	  foreign	  exchange	  futures	  
	  
	  
























































































































































































































Banks Resident Institutional Investor Non-resident investor
Source: BMFBovespa. Authors´elaboration.
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Table	  1:	  The	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  regulation	  in	  2009-­‐2013:	  main	  measures	  






Oct./2009	  	   10	  CC	  	   Tighten	   Implementation	   of	   a	   2	   percent	   financial	  transaction	   tax	   (IOF)	   on	   non-­‐resident	   equity	   and	  fixed	  income	  portfolio	  inflows.	  	  
Oct./2010	  	   20	   and	   30	  CC	  	   Tighten	   (i)	   IOF	   increased	   from	   2	   to	   4	   percent	   for	   fixed	  income	  portfolio	  investments	  and	  equity	  funds.	  	  (ii)	   IOF	   increased	   to	   6	   percent	   for	   fixed	   income	  investments.	  
Oct./2010	   10	   and	   20	  FXDR	   Tighten	   (i)	  IOF	  on	  margin	  requirements	  on	  FX	  derivatives	  transactions	  increased	  from	  0.38	  to	  6	  percent.	  (ii)	   Loopholes	   for	   IOF	   on	   margin	   requirements	  closed.	  
Jan./2011	   10	  PR	   Tighten	   Non-­‐interest	   reserve	   requirement	   equivalent	   to	  60	  percent	  of	  bank´s	  short	  dollar	  positions	   in	  the	  FX	  spot	  market	   that	  exceed	  US$	  3	  billion	  or	   their	  capital	  base.	  
Mar./2011	  	   40	  CC	  	   Tighten	   Increased	   to	   6	   percent	   the	   IOF	   on	   new	   foreign	  loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	  a	  year.	  	  
April/2011	  	   50	  CC	  	   Tighten	   (i)	   6	   percent	   IOF	   extended	   for	   the	   renewal	   of	  foreign	  loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	  a	  year.	  	  (ii)	   6	   percent	   IOF	   extended	   for	   both	   new	   and	  renewed	   foreign	   loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	   to	  2	  years.	  
July/2011	   20	  PR	   Tighten	   Non-­‐interest	   reserve	   requirement	  mandatory	   for	  amounts	   over	   USD	   1	   billion	   or	   capital	   base	  (whichever	  is	  smaller).	  
July/2011	   30	  FXDR	   Tighten	   Excessive	   long	  net	   positions	   on	  FX	  derivatives	   of	  	  all	  agents	  pay	  a	   IOF	  of	  1	  percent.	  This	   tax	  can	  be	  increased	  up	  to	  25	  per	  cent.	  
Dec/2011	  	   60	  CC	   Loosen	   IOF	   on	   equity	   and	   fixed	   income	   (linked	   with	  infrastructure	  projects)	  portfolio	   inflows	  reduced	  to	  0	  percent.	  	  
Mar./2012	  	   70	  CC	  	   Tighten	   (i)	   6	   percent	   IOF	   extended	   for	   both	   new	   and	  renewed	   foreign	   loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	   to	  3	  	  and	  then	  to	  5	  years.	  (ii)	   Export	   advanced	   payment	   transactions	   with	  maturities	  of	  more	  than	  a	  year	  prohibited.	  
Mar./2012	   40	  FXDR	   Loosen	   Exporters	   hedge	   operations	   exempted	   from	   the	  IOF.	  
June/2012	   80	  CC	   Loosen	   6	  percent	   IOF	  only	   for	   new	  and	   renewed	   foreign	  loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	  to	  2	  years.	  
Dec./2012	   90	  CC	  	   Loosen	   (i)	  6	  percent	  IOF	  for	  foreign	  loans	  with	  maturities	  of	  up	  to	  1	  year	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(ii)Export	   advanced	   payment	   transactions	  maturity	  extended	  from	  1	  for	  5	  years.	  
Jun./2013	   100	  CC	   Loosen	   IOF	  on	  fixed	  income	  portfolio	  inflows	  reduced	  to	  0	  percent.	  
Jun./2013	   50	  FXDR	   Loosen	   IOF	  of	  1	  percent	  on	  excessive	  long	  net	  positions	  of	  FX	  derivatives	  of	  all	  agents	  reduced	  to	  0	  percent.	  
Jul./2013	   30	  PR	   Loosen	   Non-­‐interest	  reserve	  requirement	  on	  bank´s	  short	  dollar	   positions	   in	   the	   FX	   spot	   market	   reduced	  from	  60	  percent	  to	  0	  percent	  	  Source:	  Own	  elaboration	  based	  on	  BCB´s	  and	  Minister	  of	  Finance´s	  websites.	  	  	  Note:	  (1)	  FX	  =	  Foreign	  exchange;	  CC	  =	  Capital	  Control;	  PR	  =	  Prudential	  Regulation;	  FXDR	  =	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Derivatives	  Regulation.	  	   With	   respect	   to	   currency	   appreciation,	   the	   turning	   point	   was	   July	   2011,	   when	   a	  broader	  set	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  derivatives	  regulations	  was	  launched	  (see	  Graph	  1).	  On	  29	  July	  2010,	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  adopted	  a	   financial	   tax	  of	  1	  percent	  on	  excessively	  long	  positions	   on	   BRL	   in	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	  market	   (see	   table	   1).	   As	   this	   tax	   is	  calculated	   on	   the	   notional	   value	   of	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	   operations,	   it	   has	   a	  major	   impact	   on	   the	   derivatives	   carry	   trade.	   Right	   after	   its	   entry	   in	   force,	   the	   Brazilian	  currency	  started	  to	  depreciate,	  before	  the	  loosening	  of	  the	  monetary	  policy	  (Graph	  1).	  From	  the	  end	  of	  August,	   the	  depreciation	   trend	  has	  been	   fostered	  by	   the	  policy	   rate	   reductions	  (Graph	  2)	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  risk	  aversion	  of	  foreign	  agents	  due	  to	  the	  worsening	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2011.	  Moreover,	  the	  other	  way	  around	  has	  also	  taken	  place.	  The	   regulations	   launched	  by	   the	  Brazilian	  government	   to	   stem	   the	  currency	  appreciation,	  especially	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	   regulations,	  may	   have	   amplified	   the	   effects	   of	  the	  policy	   rate	  drops	  between	  August	  2011	  and	  October	  2012	  on	   the	  BRL/USD	  exchange	  rate.	  	  	   	  Until	   the	   first	   half	   of	   2011,	   the	   financial	   regulatory	   toolkit	   mainly	   impacted	   the	  composition	  of	  inflows	  rather	  than	  their	  volume	  and	  did	  not	  stop	  the	  BRL	  appreciation,	  its	  main	   policy	   goal	   (Baumann	   and	   Gallagher,	   2012) 7 .	   From	   then,	   the	   shift	   in	   the	  macroeconomic	   regime	   towards	   what	   we	   called	   here	   a	   ‘dirty	   inflation	   targeting	   regime’	  gave	  room	  to	  a	  lower	  policy	  rate.	  This	  regime	  shift	  increased	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  toolkit	  of	   capital	   account	   and	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	   regulations	   in	   curbing	   the	   currency	  appreciation	   because	   it	   has	   both	   led	   to	  minor	   returns	   of	   carry	   trade	   operations	   and	   has	  reduced	   to	   attractiveness	   of	   the	   regulatory	   arbitrage	   operations.	   Furthermore,	   investors´	  expectations	  that	  the	  BCB	  will	  keep	  the	  Brazilian	  currency	  in	  a	  depreciated	  level	  have	  also	  discouraged	   these	   two	   classes	   of	   operations.	   Concerning	   the	   traditional	   carry	   trade	  (through	   capital	   flows),	   over	   the	   second	   half	   of	   2011,	   speculative	   flows	   have	   dwindled,	  resulting	  in	  the	  shrinking	  of	  total	  financial	  flows	  (see	  Graph	  3).	  Therefore,	  besides	  shaping	  the	   composition	   of	   capital	   flows,	   the	   capital	   account	   regulations	   launched	   by	   Brazil	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Based	  on	  an	  econometric	  model	  (a	  GARCH	  regression),	  Baumann	  and	  Gallagher	  (2012)	  have	  found	  that	  
the	  introduction	  of	  capital	  account	  regulations	  in	  Brazil	  between	  October	  2009	  and	  December	  2012	  was	  
associated	   with	   a	   shift	   from	   short-­‐term	   to	   longer-­‐term	   inflows.	   They	   have	   also	   found	   that	   Brazil’s	  
measures	  had	   a	   lasting	   impact	   on	   the	   level	   and	   volatility	   of	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	  modestly	   increased	  
Brazilian	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy.	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8	  On	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  capital	  outflow	  regulations,	  see	  Epstein	  (2012).	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4.	   	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Cross-­‐Border	   Financial	   Management	   and	   the	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In	  terms	  of	  party	  politics,	  it	  should	  be	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  second	  and	  third	  capital	  controls	  and	  the	  first	  and	  second	  foreign	  exchange	  derivatives	  measures	  (see	  Table	  1)	  were	  taken	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  heated	  election	  campaign	  that	  pitted	  the	  workers	  party	  (PT)	  against	  the	   center-­‐right	   Brazilian	   Social	   Democratic	   party	   (PSDB).	   	   Capital	   flows	   and	   controls	  played	  well	  because	  they	  could	  resonate	  with	  the	  worker’s	  party	  base	  of	  trade	  unionists	  and	  progressives	  who	  have	  a	  long	  history	  of	  disdain	  for	  the	  US	  and	  the	  IMF	  and	  other	  external	  forces	   interfering	  with	   the	   ability	   of	   government	   to	   conduct	  pro-­‐growth	   and	   employment	  strategies.	   	  Whereas	   the	   IMF,	  many	   in	   the	  banking	   sector,	   and	   the	  PSDB	  were	   saying	   that	  Brazil	   should	   cut	   its	   fiscal	   budget	   to	   deal	   with	   capital	   flows,	   Dilma	   Rousseff,	   the	   PT	  candidate,	  repeatedly	  argued	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  budget	  would	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  whims	  of	  foreign	   finance	   and	   she	  would	   not	   let	   foreigners	   hold	   domestic	   growth	   and	   employment	  ‘hostage.’	  (Ennes,	  2010).	  Employment	  creation	  and	  job	  security	  is	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  PT	  and	  drove	  all	  major	  macro-­‐economic	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Thus	  the	  lack	  of	  competitiveness	  of	  Brazil	  firms	  became	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  concerns	  of	  the	  PT	  government	  from	  2009	  to	  2011.	  	  Firms	  were	  losing	  competitiveness,	  shedding	  jobs,	  and	  thus	  eroding	  the	  base	  of	  support	  for	  the	  ruling	  party.	  The	  PT	  was	  also	  backed	  by	  the	  general	  public	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  crises	  and	   inflation.	   Brazilians	   have	   experienced	   at	   least	   three	   major	   financial	   crises	   since	   the	  1980s,	  and	  the	  specter	  of	  crises	  and	  inflation	  hangs	  in	  the	  memories	  of	  many.	  	  They	  thus	  see	  a	  longer-­‐term	  view,	  recognizing	  that	  the	  currency	  appreciation	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  export	  markets	  and	  subsequent	  loss	  of	  jobs.	  	  Moreover,	  Brazilians	  remember	  the	  capital	  flight	  that	  often	   follows.	   	   The	   related	   inflation	   is	   something	   that	   no	   Brazilian	   wants	   to	   go	   back	   to.	  	  These	  memories	  are	  strong	  and	  were	  evoked	  by	  leaders	  and	  proponents	  of	  capital	  account	  regulations	  throughout	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  inflation	  and	  stability	  trump	  the	  purchasing	   power	   concerns	   of	   Brazilian	   consumers,	   it	   simply	   suggests	   that	   Brazilian	  consumers	  have	  a	  higher	  tolerance	  for	  some	  (but	  not	  drastic)	  depreciation	  in	  the	  currency	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  stable	  and	  job	  enhancing.	  The	  PT	  put	  in	  place	  myriad	  technocrats	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  that	  saw	  the	  intervention	  in	   capital	   markets	   as	   good	   policy.	   	   Many	   of	   these	   economists	   came	   from	   the	   ‘Minskian	  developmentalist’9	  tradition	   and	  were	   trained	   in	  Brazilian	   universities	   and	   some	  Western	  ones	  where	  such	   ideas	  continue	   to	   thrive.	  The	   training	  and	  background—as	  well	   as	   some	  post-­‐election	   turnover	  —	   of	   some	   of	   the	   key	   players	   in	   Brazil	   provided	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  country	   to	  design	  and	   implement	   innovative	  regulation.	   	   	  The	   thrust	  of	   the	  new	   ideas—to	  impose	   the	   IOF	   and	   to	   create	   new	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	   measures	   and	   fine	   tune	  these	  measures	  as	  markets	  reacted—came	  from	  the	  Finance	  Ministry.	  	  As	  noted	  already,	  the	  Finance	   Ministry	   had	   long	   been	   headed	   by	   Guido	   Mantega.	   Mantega	   holds	   a	   PhD	   in	  Development	   Sociology	   from	   the	   Philosophy,	   Sciences	   and	   Liberal	   Arts	   School	   of	   the	  University	  of	  São	  Paulo	  and	  he	  also	  studied	  at	  the	  Institute	  of	  Development	  Studies	  (IDS)	  of	  the	   University	   of	   Sussex,	   England.	   	   Both	   of	   these	   places	   have	   strong	   ‘developmentalist’	  traditions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Minskian	  developmentalism	  merges	  two	  strands	  of	  thought	  —	  post-­‐Keynesian	  macroeconomics	  and	  
structuralist	  developmental	  thought.	  These	  economists	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  structural	  change	  as	  
well	  as	  of	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  stability	  that	  supports	  structural	  change	  (see	  Gallagher,	  2014).	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The	  real	  brainchild	  of	  the	  effort	  was	  the	  Deputy-­‐Minister	  of	  Finance,	  Nelson	  Barbosa	  de	   Filho.	   A	   younger	   economist,	   he	   was	   hired	   by	   the	   Brazilian	   government	   in	   2005	   and	  worked	  his	  way	   to	  be	   the	  Economic	  Policy	  Secretary	   from	  2008	   to	  2010	  before	  becoming	  Deputy	  Minister	  until	  2013.	  Barbosa	  and	  his	  team	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  masterminds	  behind	  the	  design	   and	   introduction	   of	   the	   capital	   account	   regulations	   in	   Brazil.	   	   Barbosa	   (2011)	  described	   his	   approach	   to	   macroeconomic	   policy	   in	   Brazil	   as	   “structuralist-­‐keynesian”.	  Structuralism	  is	  a	  deep-­‐rooted	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  Latin	  America	  owing	  its	  origins	  to	  Raul	  Prebisch.	   	  Core	  themes	  of	  this	  school	  are	  the	  need	  for	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  channel	  finance	  toward	  productive	  sectors	  that	  can	  change	  the	  structure	  of	  an	  economy	   toward	   higher	   valued-­‐added	   and	   employment	   intensive	   goods.	   Barbosa	   studied	  under	  Lance	  Taylor	  at	   the	  New	  School	   for	  Social	  Research	   in	  New	  York	  and	  moves	   in	   the	  same	   circles	   as	   Ricardo	   Ffrench-­‐Davis	   and	   Jose	   Antonio	   Ocampo.	   	   Taylor,	   a	   former	   MIT	  professor	  of	  Paul	  Krugman	  and	  others,	  is	  a	  pioneer	  of	  structuralism	  and	  has	  spawned	  many	  high-­‐level	  financial	  policy	  makers	  across	  the	  developing	  world	  (Taylor,	  2004).	  	  	  Paramount	   to	   the	   outcome	  of	   innovative	   capital	   account	   regulation	   in	  Brazil	   is	   an	  understanding	   of	   the	   varying	   jurisdictions	   assigned	   to	   different	   Brazilian	   institutions.	  Brazil’s	   finance	  ministry,	   like	  many	  of	   its	  counterparts,	  has	   jurisdiction	  over	  all	  tax	  policy,	  including	  any	  taxes	  on	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  (Prates	  2012a).	  	  Moreover,	  all	  monetary,	  credit,	  and	   exchange	   rate	   policies	   in	   Brazil	   must	   be	   agreed	   upon	   by	   consensus	   by	   its	   National	  Monetary	  Council	   (CMN).	   	  Founded	   in	  1964	  the	  CMN	  is	  comprised	  not	  only	  of	   the	  Central	  Bank	  president,	  but	  also	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Planning,	  Budget,	  and	  Management	  (Paula,	  2011).	  	  The	  initial	  IOF	  taxes	  were	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  Finance	  Ministry	  under	   its	  own	  discretion.	   It	  was	  at	   the	  CMN	  where	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	   introduced	  the	  innovative	  measures	  to	  regulate	  foreign	  exchange	  derivative	  markets.	  During	   the	   administration	  of	   President	   Luiz	   Inacio	   Lula	  da	   Silva,	  Barbosa	  was	  not	  able	   to	   garner	   support	   for	   broader	   measures	   in	   the	   CMN,	   and	   resorted	   to	   the	   taxation	  measures	  that	  did	  not	  need	  CMN	  approval.	  	  However,	  after	  the	  election	  there	  were	  moves	  in	  the	  Central	  Bank	  that	  brought	  individuals	  to	  power	  who	  saw	  more	  eye	  to	  eye	  with	  Barbosa’s	  team.	   	  Henrique	  Meirelles,	  who	  headed	   the	  Central	  Bank	   through	   the	  Lula	   administration	  (and	   the	   IMF	   loans),	  would	  make	   numerous	   public	   statements	   about	   being	   on	   the	   “same	  page”	   of	   Finance	   Ministry	   about	   the	   measures,	   but	   privately	   was	   much	   less	   supportive.	  Meirelles	  was	  educated	  in	  Brazil	  and	  the	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  and	  headed	  BankBoston’s	  Brazil	  operations	   from	  1984	   to	  1996	  and	   then	  was	  head	  of	  global	   finance	   for	  FleetBoston	  Financial	   in	  Brazil.	   	  Moreover,	   interviewees	   noted	   that	   under	  Meirelles	   and	   Lula	   the	   goal	  was	   to	   regain	   credibility	  with	   the	  markets	   (Brazil	   had	   a	   severe	   crisis	   under	   the	   Cardoso	  administration	  and	  Lula	  had	   to	   regain	  global	  market	   confidence	   thereafter)	   and	  Meirelles	  was	  concerned	  that	  regulating	  inflows	  might	  send	  the	  wrong	  signals.	   	  On	  Meirelles’	  watch,	  Brazil	   repaid	   its	   debts	   and	   accumulated	   enough	   reserves	   (having	   enough	   for	   almost	   12	  months	  of	  imports	  or	  90	  percent	  of	  external	  debt	  at	  the	  time	  the	  IOFs	  started)	  by	  the	  time	  consideration	  of	  these	  measures	  occurred.	   	  The	  Central	  Bank	  thought	  it	  had	  the	  “space”	  to	  act	  with	   controls	   in	   this	  post-­‐credibility	  phase	  but	  may	  not	  have	  done	   so	  earlier.	   	   Indeed,	  while	  many	  nations	  such	  as	  Colombia	  next	  door	  deployed	  controls	  on	  inflows	  between	  2003	  and	  2009,	  Brazil	  had	  not.	  	  	  The	   appointment	   of	   Alexandre	  Antonio	   Tombini	   after	   the	   election	   changed	   things	  somewhat.	   	  Tombini	   is	   largely	   seen	  as	  being	  more	   ‘flexible’	   in	  his	   thinking	   than	  Meirelles	  was.	  Tombini	  is	  largely	  credited	  (or	  chastised)	  for	  loosening	  Brazil’s	  inflation	  target	  scheme	  as	  he	  entered	  office.	  Tombini	   received	  a	  PhD	   in	  economics	   from	   the	  University	  of	   Illinois,	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Urbana	   Champaign.	   	   The	   draw	   for	   Urbana	   Champaign	   for	   Brazilians,	   far	   from	   being	   a	  bastion	   of	   New	   Classical	   Macroeconomic	   thought,	   had	   long	   been	   Werner	   Baer,	   a	  development	  economist	  who	  graduated	   from	  Harvard	   in	  1958.	  Those	  Harvard	  years	  are	  a	  high	  water	  mark	  for	  developmentalist	   thought	  with	  Albert	  O.	  Hirschman	  and	  many	  others	  on	  the	   faculty.	  Tombini	  had	  been	  at	   the	  BCB	  for	  some	  time,	  negotiating	  country	  programs	  with	   the	   IMF	   throughout	   the	  2000s.	   	  Tombini	  was	  part	  of	   a	  more	  pragmatic	   group	   in	   the	  Central	   Bank,	   where	   there	   is	   a	   long	   history	   of	   using	   capital	   controls,	   even	   during	   the	  liberalization	   period	   (Paula,	   2011;	   Cardoso	   and	   Goldfajn,	   1998).	   	   The	   amount	   of	   inflows	  became	   so	   large	   that	   many	   of	   those	   tools	   were	   seen	   as	   already	   in	   use	   and	   up	   against	  economic	   and	   political	   limits,	   especially	   the	   accumulation	   of	   reserves,	   which	  were	   costly	  given	   the	   high	   interest	   rate	   and	   becoming	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   sterilize.	   	   Finally,	  according	  to	  Barbosa,	  he	  had	  to	  ‘reframe’	  capital	  flows	  as	  ‘externalities’	  to	  his	  colleagues	  in	  the	   central	   bank.	   	   To	   key	   members	   within	   the	   bank,	   this	   new	   language	   on	   the	   welfare	  economics	   of	   capital	   controls	   and	   statements	   of	   the	   IMF	   “spoke	   the	   same	   language”	   as	  Central	  Bank	  economists	  with	  more	  neoclassical	  training	  than	  in	  the	  Finance	  Ministry.	  	  This	  group	  was	  much	  more	  willing	  to	  go	  along	  with	  ideas	  of	  Barbosa’s	  team.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   jurisdictions	   of	   the	   CMN	   and	   the	   finance	   ministry,	   another	  institutional	   feature	   of	   Brazilian	   political	   economy	   also	   played	   a	   key	   role.	   	   Exporters	   in	  developing	   country	   contexts	   in	   cases	   where	   debt	   is	   denominated	   in	   dollars	   tend	   to	   be	  against	  regulating	  capital	  flows	  because	  if	  such	  measures	  devalued	  the	  currency,	  the	  value	  of	   their	  debt	  would	   increase	  (see	  Freiden,	  1991;	  Leiteritz,	  2012).	   	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  export	  industries	  are	  often	  supportive	  of	  cross-­‐border	  finance	  because	  they	  are	  reliant	  on	  foreign	  capital	  markets	   to	   finance	   their	   trade.	   	  But	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  much	  of	   the	  export	  sector	  receives	   subsidized	   credit	   from	   public	   banks	   (Brazilian	   National	   Development	   Bank	   -­‐	  BNDES	  and	  Banco	  do	  Brasil	  –	  BB)	  out	  of	  earmarked	  resources.10	  This	  partly	  explains	  why	  many	  export	  capitalists	  in	  Brazil	  were	  supportive	  of	  the	  measures	  taken	  to	  regulate	  cross-­‐border	  finance.	  	  	  The	  forty	  percent	  nominal	  appreciation	  was	  affecting	  the	  Brazilian	  export	  industry.	  	  In	  addition	  importing	  competing	  industrial	  sectors	  were	  voicing	  concern	  as	  well.	  	  All	  of	  the	  major	  business	  groups,	  including	  the	  Federation	  of	  Industries	  of	  Sao	  Paulo	  (FIESP),	  National	  Confederation	  of	  Industry	  (CNI),	  Federation	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Associations	  from	  the	  state	  of	  Sao	  Paulo	  (FACESP),	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  Foreign	  Trade	  Association	  (AEB)	  made	  statements	  throughout	   2009	   to	   2011	   in	   support	   of	   the	   IOF	   and	   related	  measures.	   	   Both	   Paulo	   Skaf,	  president	  of	  FIESP	  and	  Armando	  Monteiro	  Neto,	  president	  of	  the	  CNI	  told	  the	  press	  that	  the	  measures	  would	   save	   exporters,	   divert	   speculators,	   and	  prevent	   layoffs	   (O	  Estado	  de	   Sao	  Paolo,	  2009).	   	   Individual	  exporters	  weighed	   in	  as	  well,	   such	  as	  Brasil	  Foods	   (BRF),	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  exporters	   in	   the	  country,	  with	  external	   sales	  around	  US$	  5	  billion	  a	  year.	  BRF	  issued	   a	   statement	   that	   the	  measures	   taken	   by	   the	   government	   to	   tax	   derivatives	  will	   be	  “positive	  for	  exporters.”(Reuters,	  2011).	  The	   strong	   party	   ideology	   and	   technocrats,	   the	   CMN	   institution,	   and	   the	   backing	  from	  industry	  all	   integrate	  to	  explain	  how	  Brazil	  acted	  as	   it	  did.	   	  As	  theory	  would	  predict,	  many	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   were	   not	   supportive	   of	   the	   measures.	   Domestic	   banks,	  international	  banks,	  the	  Institute	  for	  International	  Finance,	  and	  even	  the	  IMF	  all	  weighed	  in	  on	   the	   measures.	   	   The	   main	   narrative	   of	   each	   of	   these	   actors,	   as	   Goodman	   and	   Pauly’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  	  This	  segment	  includes bank loans with lower interest rates that follow some kind of earmarking 
allocation according to government regulations.	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(1993)	  work	  would	  suggest,	  was	   that	   the	  measures	  would	  be	  evadable	  and	   thus	  wouldn’t	  work.	   	   They	   argued	   that	   the	   Finance	   Ministry	   and	   Central	   Bank	   should	   work	   to	   lower	  interest	  rates	  and	  trim	  fiscal	  budgets	  instead.	  	  	  Until	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2013,	  these	  were	  the	  prevailing	  interests	  over	  those	  of	  the	  private	   banking	   system	   and	   international	   banks,	   the	   Brazilian	   stock	   market	   head,	   the	  Institute	   for	   International	   Finance,	   and	   some	   international	   experts	   from	   ratings	   agencies	  and	  investment	  banks.	   	  As	  Cohen	  (1998),	  Goodman	  and	  Pauly	  (1993),	  Frieden	  (1991)	  and	  Kirshner	   (1995)	  would	  predict,	   these	  actors	   stood	   to	  gain	   from	   inflows	  of	   foreign	   finance	  and	  to	  lose	  from	  efforts	  to	  curtail	  such	  flows.	  Edemir	  Pinto,	  President	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  stock	  exchange,	  was	   constantly	   in	   the	  press	   saying	   that	   each	  measure	  would	  hurt	   the	  Brazilian	  futures	  market,	  and/or	  be	  circumvented.	  	  	  International	  players	  weighed	  in	  as	  well.	  Three	  representatives	  from	  JP	  Morgan,	  as	  well	  as	  experts	   from	  Barclays,	   the	  Economist	   Intelligence	  Unit,	  and	  Bank	  of	  America	  were	  quoted	  as	  saying	  that	  the	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  Brazil	  were	  worrisome	  because	  they	  would	  cause	  uncertainty	  among	  investors	  about	  Brazil	  and	  also	  warned	  that	  the	  measures	  would	  likely	   be	   ineffective	   in	   meeting	   their	   goals.	   	   The	   IMF	   too,	   was	   initially	   not	   supportive	   of	  Brazil’s	  measures.	   	  Instead,	  the	  IMF	  told	  Brazil	  that	  its	  main	  problems	  were	  with	  its	  public	  budget	  and	  public	  banks	  provision	  of	  credit.	  	  If	  these	  two	  trends	  were	  curtailed,	  the	  problem	  would	  be	  alleviated.	  	  	  	  However,	  since	  the	  IMF	  had	  been	  paid	  back	  by	  Brazil	  under	  the	  Lula	  government,	  Brazil	  was	  no	   longer	  bound	  by	   IMF	   commitments	   and	   therefore	  had	   the	   full	  policy	  space	  under	  the	  IMF	  Articles.	  	  Moreover,	  Brazil	  had	  not	  made	  many	  commitments	  in	  financial	   services	   liberalization	   at	   the	  WTO,	   nor	   does	   Brazil	   have	   regional	   and	   bi-­‐lateral	  treaties	  with	  neighbours	  that	  curtailed	  its	  ability	  to	  deploy	  capital	  account	  regulations.	  In	   the	   face	   of	   overwhelming	   capital	   flows	   (see	   Graph	   3)	   and	   a	   well	   organized	  financial	   sector,	   Brazil	   re-­‐regulated	   capital	   flows	   to	  modest	   success.	   	   A	   strong	   PT	   armed	  with	  economists	  and	  technocrats	  that	  had	  the	  power	  to	  channel	  party	  policy	  into	  the	  central	  bank	   were	   essential	   factors,	   as	   was	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   finance	   ministry	   to	   reframe	   the	  regulations	  as	  ‘corrective’	  rather	  than	  distortive.	  	  The	  party	  had	  the	  backing	  of	  its	  traditional	  workers	   and	   general	   public,	   but	   also	   of	   strong	   international	   capitalists	   who	  were	   not	   as	  linked	   with	   global	   finance	   as	   in	   other	   countries	   because	   of	   BNDES	   and	   regulations	   on	  commercial	  banks.	  	  Finally,	  Brazil	  had	  preserved	  its	  policy	  space	  to	  regulate	  at	  home	  under	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  WTO.	  	  
5.	  	  Conclusions	  	  	   Brazil	   is	   part	   of	   resurgence	   of	   ‘developmentalism’	   in	   the	   21st	   century.	   	   However,	  while	  China,	  Vietnam,	  and	  many	  East	  Asian	  economies	  engage	  in	  industrial	  policy	  they	  do	  so	  under	   a	   closed	   capital	   account	   and	   a	   relatively	   pegged	   exchange	   rate	   regime.	   	   Brazil,	   like	  many	  countries	   in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  old	   ‘tigers’	  of	  East	  Asia,	  now	  has	  an	  open	  capital	  account	   and	   a	   floating	   exchange	   rate	   regime.	   	   Given	   the	  massive	   volume	   and	   volatility	   in	  cross-­‐border	   finance	   into	   Brazil	   and	   other	   EMEs	   with	   open	   capital	   accounts,	   Brazil	   has	  significantly	  more	  challenges	  than	  their	  Chinese	  and	  Vietnamese	  counterparts.	  	  In	  addition	  to	   conducting	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   microeconomic	   policies	   to	   build	   and	   foster	   economic	  diversification,	   Brazil	   also	   has	   to	   pay	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   attention	   to	   cross-­‐border	  finance.	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This	  paper	  has	  shown	  that	  Brazil	  has	  attempted	  to	  rise	  to	  these	  challenges,	  but	  with	  limited	   success.	   	   Alongside	   its	   industrialization	   policies	   Brazil	   has	   engaged	   in	   aggressive	  exchange	   rate	   management	   and	   capital	   account	   and	   foreign	   exchange	   derivatives	  regulations	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Our	  subsequent	  analysis	  of	  the	  politics	  of	   post-­‐crisis	   exchange	   rate	   management	   in	   Brazil	   reveals	   that	   the	   country	   has	   unique	  institutional	  arrangements	  —	  the	   IOF	   tax,	   the	  council,	   the	  BNDES,	  and	  policy	  space	  under	  trade	   treaties	  —	   coupled	  with	  workers	   and	   industrial	   exporters	  who	   are	   concerned	  with	  competitiveness,	  and	  a	  party	  currently	  in	  power	  committed	  to	  these	  interests	  that	  helped	  it	  overcome	  the	  major	  forces	  that	  usually	  deem	  government	  action	  as	  futile.	  	  	  The	  limited	  success	  was	  due,	  mainly,	  to	  the	  delay	  of	  Brazilian	  policy	  makers	  to	  use	  these	   features,	   which	  widen	   the	   country´s	   policy	   space,	   to	  manage	   the	   exchange	   rate	   for	  purpose	   of	   external	   competitiveness	   and,	   consequently,	   for	   curbing	   the	   hollowing	   out	   of	  investment	   in	   industrial	   sectors.	   Further,	  more	   recently,	   in	   face	   of	   inflationary	   pressures,	  financial	   group	  pressures	  and	   the	   sheer	  power	  of	   global	   capital	  markets	   (including	   rating	  agencies),	   the	   BCB	   has	   raised	   again	   the	   policy	   rate	   and	   restarted	   to	   use	   the	   domestic	  currency	   appreciation	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   the	   inflation	   target	   policy.	   Therefore,	   the	  ‘developmentalist	  agenda’	  and	  the	  country´s	  economic	  diversification	  –	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  a	  project	  of	  stability-­‐led	  growth	  –	  could	  be	  once	  more	  under	  threat.	  	   	  
	   24	  
References	  Akyüz,	   Yilmaz	   (2011)	   “Capital	   flows	   to	   developing	   countries	   in	   a	   historical	  perspective.	   Will	   the	   current	   boom	   end	   with	   a	   bust	   and	   how?”	   South	   Centre	  
Research	  Paper	  37.	  Akyüz,	  Yilmaz,	  CORNFORD,	  Andrew	  (1999).	  Capital	  Flows	  to	  Developing	  Countries	  and	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  International	  Financial	  System.	  UNCTAD	  Discussion	  Paper,	  n.	  143.	  Genebra:	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  -­‐	  United	  Nations.	  Agosin,	   Manuel	   and	   Franklin	   Huaita	   (2012),	   “Overeaction	   of	   capital	   flows	   in	  Emerging	  Markets:	  Booms	  and	  Sudden	  Stops,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Money	  and	  
Finance	  31	  (2012)	  1140–1155	  Aizenman,	   J.,	   Lee,	   Y.	   &	   Rhee,	   Y.	   (2004)	   “International	   Reserves	   Management	   and	  Capital	  Mobility	   in	   a	   Volatile	  World:	   Policy	   Considerations	   and	   a	   Case	   Study	   of	  Korea”.	  NBER,	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  10534.	  Baumann,	  Brittany	  A.,	  and	  Kevin	  P.	  Gallagher.	   (2012).	   “Navigating	  Capital	  Flows	   in	  Brazil	  and	  Chile”,	  Initiative	  for	  Policy	  Dialogue	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  June.	  Bicchetti	   D	   and	   Maystre	   N.	   (2012)	   The	   synchronized	   and	   long-­‐lasting	   structural	  change	   on	   commodity	   markets:	   Evidence	   from	   high-­‐frequency	   data.	   UNCTAD	  Discussion	  Paper	  n.	  208.	  Geneva.	  Burnside,	  Craig,	  Martin	  Eichenbaum,	   Isaac	  Kleshchelski,	  and	  Sergio	  Rebelo	  (2006).	  “The	   returns	   of	   currency	   speculation”,	   National	   Bureau	   of	   Economic	   Research	  
Working	  Paper	  12489.	  Blyth,	  Mark	  (2002)	  Great	  Transformations:	  Economic	  Ideas	  and	  Institutional	  Change	  
in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Block,	   F.	   (1977)	   The	   origins	   of	   International	   Economic	  Disorder.	  Berkeley	   and	   Los	  Angeles,	  California	  University	  Press,	  Ltd.	  Calvo,	  G.	  &	  Reinhart,	  C.	  (2002)	  “Fear	  of	  Floating”.	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  Vol.	  117,	  No.	  2,	  May.	  Calvo,	  Guillermo	  (1998),	  “The	  Simple	  Economics	  of	  Sudden	  Stops,”	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  
Economics,	  35-­‐54.	  Carvalho,	  F.	   J.	  C.	   (2010)	  “The	  Accumulation	  of	   International	  Reserves	  as	  a	  Defense	  Strategy”.	  In:	  Griffith-­‐Jones,	  S.,	  Ocampo,	  J.	  A.	  &	  Stiglitz,	  J.	  E.	  (2010)	  (eds.)	  Time	  for	  
a	   Visible	   Hand:	   Lessons	   from	   the	   2008	   World	   Financial	   Crisis.	   Oxford,	   Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Chamon,	   M.;	   Garcia,	   M.	   (2013)	   “Capital	   controls	   in	   Brazil:	   effective?”	   Discussion	  
Paper,	  PUC/RJ,	  March	  12,	  2013.	  Chesnais,	  F.	  (1996)	  “Introduction	  Générale”.	  In:	  Chesnais,	  F.	  (ed.)	  La	  Mondialisation	  
Financière:	  Genèse,	  Coût	  et	  Enjeux.	  Paris,	  Syros.	  Cohen,	  B.	  J.	  (1998)	  The	  Geography	  of	  Money.	  Ithaca,	  Cornell	  University	  Press	  
	   25	  
Davidson,	   P.	   (1998)	   “Volatile	   Financial	   Markets	   and	   the	   Speculator”.	   Economic	  
Issues,	  Vol.	  3,	  No.	  2,	  September.	  __________.	   (2000)	   “Liquidity	   vs.	   Efficiency	   in	   Liberalized	   International	   Financial	  Markets:	  A	  Warning	  to	  Developing	  Economies”.	  Revista	  de	  Economia	  Política,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  3	  (79),	  jul.-­‐set.	  Dooley,	  M.,	  Folkerts-­‐Landau,	  D.	  &	  Garber,	  P.	  (2005)	  International	  Financial	  Stability.	  
Deutsche	   Bank,	   Global	   Markets	   Research,	   October.	  [http://people.ucsc.edu/~mpd/InternationalFinancialStability_update.pdf]	  Dow,	   S.	   C.	   (1999)	   “International	   Liquidity	   Preference	   and	   Endogenous	   Credit”.	   In:	  Deprez,	   J.	   &	   Harvey,	   J.	   T.	   (1999)	   (eds.)	  Foundations	   of	   International	  Economics:	  
Post	  Keynesian	  Perspectives.	  London,	  Routledge.	  Epstein,	  G	  (2012)	  Capital	  outflow	  regulation:	  economic	  management,	  development	  and	   transformation,	   in:	   Gallagher,	   Kevin,	   and	   Leonardo	   Stanley,	   eds.,	   Capital	  
Account	   Regulations	   and	   the	   Trading	   System:	   A	   Compatibility	   Review,	   Boston:	  Frederick	  S.	  Pardee	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Longer-­‐Range	  Future,	  47-­‐58	  	  Ennes,	  Uliana	  (2010),	  Dilma	  acredita	  que	  ajuste	  fiscal	  não	  é	  suficiente	  para	  segurar	  câmbio,	   Valor	   Econômico,	   6-­‐10-­‐2010.	  http://www.valor.com.br/arquivo/682985/dilma-­‐acredita-­‐que-­‐ajuste-­‐fiscal-­‐nao-­‐e-­‐suficiente-­‐para-­‐segurar-­‐cambio#ixzz1zgNRSzhJ	  Estrategia	   (2011),	   Exporters	   value	   Central	   Bank	   Action,	   April	  1.http://www.estrategia.cl/detalle_noticia.php?cod=36312	  Fourcade,	   M.	   2006.	   “The	   Construction	   of	   a	   Global	   Profession:	   The	  Transnationalization	  of	  Economics.”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  112	  (1):	  145–194.	  Frieden,	   Jeffry	   (1991),	   “Invested	   Interests:	   The	   Politics	   of	   National	   Economic	  Policies	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Global	  Finance,”	  International	  Organization	  45,	  4,	  Autumn,	  425-­‐451.	  Frankel,	   J.	   A.	   (2003)	   Experience	   of	   and	   lessons	   from	   exchange	   rate	   regimes	   in	  emerging	   economies,	   NBER	   Working	   Paper	   10032.	   Cambridge	   M.A:	   National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research.	  Fritz,	   B.,	   Prates,	   D.	   M.	   (2013).	   “The	   new	   IMF	   approach	   to	   capital	   account	  management	   and	   its	   blind	   spots:	   lessons	   from	   Brazil	   and	   South	   Korea”,	  
International	  Review	  of	  Applied	  Economics	  28(3),	  March	  2014:	  210-­‐239	  Gagnon,	  Joseph	  E.,	  and	  Alain	  P.	  Chaboud	  (2007).	  “What	  Can	  the	  Data	  Tell	  Us	  about	  Carry	   Trades	   in	   Japanese	   Yen?”	   International	   Finance	   Discussion	   Papers	   899,	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System.	  Gallagher,	   Kevin,	   Stephany	  Griffith-­‐Jones,	   and	   José	  Antonio	  Ocampo	   (eds.)	   (2012).	  
Regulating	  Global	   Capital	   Flows	   for	   Long-­‐Run	  Development,	   Boston,	   MA:	   Pardee	  Center	  Task	  Force	  Report,	  13-­‐22.	  	  
	   26	  
Gallagher,	   Kevin,	   P	   (2014)	   Countervailing	  Monetary	   Power:	   Emerging	  Markets	   and	  
the	  Re-­‐Regulation	  of	  Cross-­‐Border	  Finance,	  Ithaca,	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Garret,	   Geoffrey	   (1995),	   “Capital	   Mobility,	   Trade,	   and	   the	   Domestic	   Politics	   of	  Economic	  Policy,”	  International	  Organization,	  49,	  4,	  Autumn	  1995,	  657-­‐87.	  Ghosh,	  A,	   J	  Kim,	  MS	  Qureshi,	  and	  J	  Zalduendo	  (2012),	  “Surges”,	   IMF	  Working	  Paper	  12/22.	  Goodman,	  John	  B.,	  &	  Pauly,	  Louis	  W.	  (1993).	  "The	  Obsolescence	  of	  Capital	  Controls?:	  Economic	  Management	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Global	  Markets".	  World	  Politics,	  46(1),	  50-­‐82.	  Grabel,	   I.	   (1996)	   “Marketing	   the	   Third	   World:	   The	   Contradictions	   of	   Portfolio	  Investment	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy”.	  World	  Development,	  Vol.	  24,	  No.	  11.	  _______.	   (1999)	   “Emerging	   Stock	  Markets	   and	   Third	  World	   Development:	   The	   Post	  Keynesian	   Case	   for	   Pessimism”.	   In:	   Deprez,	   J.	   &	   Harvey,	   J.	   T.	   (1999)	   (eds.)	  
Foundations	   of	   International	   Economics:	   Post	   Keynesian	   Perspectives.	   London,	  Routledge.	  Greenville,	  S.	  (2000)	  Exchange	  rate	  regimes	  for	  emerging	  markets,	  BIS	  Review	  n.	  97.	  Harvey,	   J.	   T.	   (1991)	   “A	   Post	   Keynesian	   View	   of	   Exchange	   Rate	   Determination”.	  
Journal	  of	  Post	  Keynesian	  Economics,	  Vol.	  14,	  No.	  1,	  Fall.	  ________.	   (1999)	   “Exchange	   Rates:	   Volatility	   and	   Misalignment	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	   Era”.	   In:	   Deprez,	   J.	   &	   Harvey,	   J.	   T.	   (1999)	   (eds.)	   Foundations	   of	  
International	  Economics:	  Post	  Keynesian	  Perspectives.	  London,	  Routledge.	  ________.	   (2009)	   Currencies,	   Capital	   Flows	   and	   Crises:	   A	   Post	   Keynesian	   Analysis	   of	  
Exchange	  Rate	  Determination.	  London,	  Routledge.	  Haggard,	  Stephan,	  and	  Sylvia	  Maxfield,	   (1996)	   “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Financial	  Internationalization	  in	  the	  Developing	  World.”	  International	  Organization	  50:	  35-­‐68.	  Helleiner,	  Eric	  (1994)	  States	  and	  the	  Re-­‐Emergence	  of	  Global	  Finance,	  Ithaca,	  Cornel	  University	  Press.	  Henning,	   Randall	   (1994)	  Currencies	  and	  Politics	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  Germany,	  and	  
Japan,	  Washington,	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics.	  Hirschman,	  Albert	  O	   (1970),	  Exit,	  Voice,	  and	  Loyalty:	  Responses	  to	  Decline	   in	  Firms,	  
Organizations,	  and	  States.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Ho,	   C.;	   McCauley,	   R.	   (2003)	   Living	   with	   flexible	   exchange	   rate:	   issues	   and	   recent	  experience	  in	  inflation	  targeting	  emerging	  market	  economies,	  BIS	  Working	  Paper.	  Basle:	  Bank	  of	  International	  Settlements,	  feb.	  IMF	  (2011).	  Recent	  Experiences	  in	  Managing	  Capital	  Inflows	  –	  Cross-­‐Cutting	  Themes	  
and	   Possible	   Policy	   Framework,	   at:	   http://bit.ly/QSqrVQ	   (last	   access	  10/12/2012).	  	  
	   27	  
Kaltenbrunner,	   Annina	   (2010).	   “International	   Financialization	   and	   Depreciation:	  The	  Brazilian	  Real	  in	  the	  International	  Financial	  Crisis”.	  Competition	  and	  Change	  14(3-­‐4):	  294–321.	  	  Keynes,	  J.	  M.	  (1930)	  Treatise	  on	  money,	  vol.2	  –	  The	  Applied	  Theory	  of	  Money.	  	  The	  
Collected	  Writtings	  of	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  vol.	  VI.	  London:	  MacMillan,	  1971.	  Kregel	   (2000)	   “The	   Brazilian	   crisis:	   from	   inertial	   inflation	   to	   fiscal	   fragility”.	  
Working	  Paper	  n.	  294,	  Jerome	  Levy	  Economic	  Institut,	  February.	  _______(1999)	  “Was	  there	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  crises?”,	  Brazilian	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  19,	  nº	  3	  (75),	  july-­‐september.	  _______(1998b).	   Yes,	   “It”	   Did	   Happen	   Again	   –	   A	   Minsky	   Crisis	   Happened	   in	   Asia.	  Presented	   at	   the	   Eigth	   Annual	   Hyman	   P.	   Minsky	   Conference	   on	   Financial	  Structurem	   april	   23-­‐24.	   Working	   Paper	   n.	   234,	   The	   Jeromy	   Levy	   	   Economic	  Institute	  (http://www.levy.org).	  ________(1998a).	  East	  Asia	   is	  not	  Mexico:	   the	  difference	  between	  balance	  of	  payments	  
crises	  and	  debt	  deflations.	  Geneve:	  UNCTAD,	  mimeo.	  Kogut,	   B.,	   and	   J.	   M.	   Macpherson	   (2011).	   “The	   Mobility	   of	   Economists	   and	   the	  Diffusion	   of	   Policy	   Ideas:	   The	   Influence	   of	   Economics	   on	   National	   Policies.”	  
Research	  Policy	  40	  (10):	  1307–1320.	  Jeanne,	  Olivier	  and	  Anton	  Korinek	  (2010),	   “Excessive	  Volatility	   in	  Capital	  Flows:	  A	  Pigouvian	   Taxation	   Approach,”	   American	   Economic	   Review	   Papers	   and	  
Proceedings	  100(2),	  pp.	  403-­‐407,	  May	  2010.	  Joyce,	  Joseph,	  and	  Ilan,	  Noy	  (2008),	  The	  IMF	  and	  the	  Liberalization	  of	  Capital	  Flows.	  
Review	  of	  International	  Economics	  16	  (3):	  413-­‐430.	  Kastner,	   Scott	   and	   Chad	   Rector	   (2003),	   “International	   Regimes,	   Domestic	   Veto-­‐Players,	  and	  Capital	  Controls	  Policy	  Stability,”	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  47,	  1-­‐22.	  Kirshner,	  Jonathan	  (1995),	  Currency	  and	  Coercion,	  Ithaca,	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Kirshner,	  Jonathan	  (2003),	  “Explaining	  Choices	  about	  Money:	  Disentangling	  Power,	  Ideas,	   and	   Conflict,”	  Monetary	  Orders:	  Ambiguous	  Economics,	  Ubiquitous	  Politics,	  Jonathan	  Kirshner	  (ed),	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Kirshner,	  Jonathan	  (2006),	  “Currency	  and	  Coercion	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century,”	  in	  David	  Andrews	   (ed),	   International	  Monetary	  Power,	   Ithaca	   and	   London:	   Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Kogut,	   B.,	   and	   J.	   M.	   Macpherson	   (2011).	   “The	   Mobility	   of	   Economists	   and	   the	  Diffusion	   of	   Policy	   Ideas:	   The	   Influence	   of	   Economics	   on	   National	   Policies.”	  
Research	  Policy	  40	  (10):	  1307–1320.	  Leiteritz,	   Ralph	   (2012)	   National	   Economic	   Identity	   and	   Capital	   Mobility:	   State-­‐
Business	   Relations	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Wiesbaden:	   VS-­‐Verlag	   fuer	  Sozialwissenschaften.	  
	   28	  
McCarty,	   Nolan,	   Keith	   T.	   Poole,	   and	   Howard	   Rosenthal	   (2013)	   Political	   Bubbles:	  
Financial	   Crises	   and	   the	   Failure	   of	   American	   Democracy,	   Princeton	   University	  Press.	  Mohanty,	   M.S.;	   Scatigna,	   M.	   (2005)	   Has	   globalisation	   reduced	   monetary	   policy	  independence?	  In:	  BIS	  Papers	  n.	  23,	  2005.	  	  Ocampo,	  J.	  A.	  (2007)	  La	  macroeconomia	  de	  la	  bonanza	  econômica	  latinoamericana,	  
Revista	  de	  la	  Cepal	  n.	  93,	  diciembre.	  ______(2001a)	   “International	   asymmetries	   and	   the	   design	   of	   the	   internacional	  financial	  system”,	  Series	  temas	  de	  coyuntura,	  n.15.	  Santiago,	  Chile:	  CEPAL,	  april.	  ______(2001b)	  “Raúl	  Prebisch	  y	  la	  agenda	  del	  desarrollo	  en	  los	  albores	  del	  siglo	  XXI”,	  
Revista	  de	  la	  Cepal	  n.75.	  ______(2000)	  Developing	  countries´anti-­‐ciclycal	  policies	  in	  a	  globalized	  world,	  (Serie	  
Temas	  de	  coyuntura),	  Santigo,	  nov.	  Chile:	  Cepal.	  	  Ocampo,	   J.	  A.	  &	  Martin,	   J.	   (2003)	  Globalization	  and	  Development:	  A	  Latin	  American	  
and	  Caribbean	  Perspective.	  Palo	  Alto	  (CA),	  Stanford	  University	  Press	  O	  Estado	  de	  Sao	  Paolo	  (2009),	  “Indústria	  comemora	  decisão,	  editorial,	  O	  Estado	  de	  
Sao	   Paolo	   ,”	   20	   Octubre,	   2009.	  	  http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,industria-­‐comemora-­‐decisao,453222,0.htm	  Paula,	   Luiz	   Fernando	   (2011).	   Financial	   Liberalization	   and	   Economic	   Performance:	  
Brazil	  at	  Crossroads.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Paula,	   Luiz	   Fernando,	   and	   Daniela	   Magalhães	   Prates	   (2013).	   “Capital	   Account	  Regulation,	   Trade	   and	   Investment	   Treaties	   and	   Policy	   Space	   in	   Brazil”,	   in:	  Gallagher,	  Kevin,	  and	  Leonardo	  Stanley,	  eds.,	  Capital	  Account	  Regulations	  and	  the	  
Trading	   System:	  A	  Compatibility	  Review,	   Boston:	   Frederick	   S.	   Pardee	   Center	   for	  the	  Study	  of	  Longer-­‐Range	  Future,	  55-­‐67.	  Pauly,	   Louis	   (2006),	   “Monetary	   Statecraft	   in	   Follower	   States,”	   Andrews,	   David	  editor,	   International	   Monetary	   Power,	   Ithaca	   and	   London:	   Cornell	   University	  Press.	  Prates,	   Daniela	   Magalhães,	   and	   Marcos	   Antonio	   Macedo	   Cintra	   (2010).	   “The	  Emerging-­‐market	   Economies	   in	   the	   Face	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis”,	   in:	  Dullien,	   Sebastian,	   Detlef	   Kotte,	   Alejandro	   Márquez,	   and	   Jan	   Priewe,	   eds..	   The	  
Financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   of	   2008-­‐2009	   and	   developing	   countries,	   Geneve:	  United	  Nations,	  53-­‐71.	  Prates,	   Daniela	   Magalhães,	   André	   M.	   Cunha,	   and	   Marcos	   T.C.	   Lélis.	   (2009).	  “Exchange-­‐rate	  management	  in	  Brazil”.	  CEPAL	  Review	  (99):	  97-­‐118.	  Prates,	  D.M;	   Fritz,	   B.	   (2013)	  How	   to	   Increase	  Policy	   Space	   for	  Emerging	  Markets?	  Capital	  account	  regulation	  as	  part	  of	   the	  macroeconomic	  regime	  in	  Brazil	   in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  FMM	  research	  network	  Macroeconomics	  
and	  Macroeconomic	  Policies,	  Berlin,	  24	  –	  26	  October	  2013.	  
	   29	  
Rey,	   H.	   	   (2013)	   Dilemma	  not	   Trilemma:	   The	  Global	   Financial	   Cycle	   and	   Monetary	  
Policy	   Independence,	   London	  Business	  School,	  CEPR	  and	  NBER,	   Jackson	  	  Hole	  Symposium	  2013	  Rodrik,	  Dani.	  (2006).	  “The	  Social	  Cost	  of	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Reserves”.	  International	  
Economic	  Journal	  (20):	  3.	  Rodrik,	   Dani,	   and	   Arvind	   Subramanian	   (2009)	   Why	   Did	   Financial	   Globalization	  Disappoint?	  IMF	  Staff	  Papers	  56:112–138.	  Reuters,	  (2011),	  Para	  Brasil	  Foods,	  medida	  cambial	  pode	  ajudar	  exportações,	  Folha	  
de	   São	   Paulo,	   July	   27,	   2011:http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/950591-­‐para-­‐brasil-­‐foods-­‐medida-­‐cambial-­‐pode-­‐ajudar-­‐exportacoes.shtml	  Ventura,	  André,	  and	  Márcio	  Garcia.	  (2010).	  “Mercados	  futuro	  e	  à	  vista	  de	  câmbio	  no	  Brasil:	  o	  rabo	  balança	  o	  cachorro”,	  PUC	  Texto	  para	  Discussão	  563,	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Departamento	  de	  Economia.	  Schulmeister,	  S.	  (2009)	  Technical	  Trading	  and	  Trends	  in	  the	  Dollar-­‐Euro	  Exchange	  Rate,	  WIFO	  Monographien,	  11/2009.	  Studart,	   Rogério	   (2001)	   “Integrating	   uneven	   partners:	   the	   destabilizing	   effects	   of	  financial	   liberalization	   and	   internationalization	   of	   Latin	  American	   economies:	   a	  tribute	  to	  Don	  Raúl	  Prebisch,	  artigo	  apresentado	  no	  Seminário	  em	  homenagem	  a	  
Raúl	  Prebisch.	  UNCTAD	  (2011a).	  Price	  Formation	  in	  Financialized	  Commodity	  Markets:	  The	  Role	  of	  Information.	   United	   Nations	   publication.	   UNCTAD/GDS/2011/1.	   New	   York	   and	  Geneva.	  UNCTAD	   (2011b).	   Trade	   and	   Development	   Report,	   2011:	   Post-­‐crisis	   Policy	  Challenges	   in	   the	   World	   Economy.	   United	   Nations	   publication.	   Sales	   No.	  E.11.II.D.3.	  New	  York	  and	  Geneva.	  Wade,	   Robert	   and	   Frank	   Veneroso	   (1998),	   "The	   Gathering	  World	   Slump	   and	   the	  Battle	  over	  Capital	  Controls",	  New	  Left	  Review,	  September/October	  1998.	  Warth	  Anne	  and	  Leopoldo,	  Ricardo	  (2010),	  “Capital	  estrangeiro	  terá	  2%	  de	  IOF,”	  O	  
Estado	  de	  S.Paulo,	  20	  de	  outubro	  de	  2009.	  	  http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,capital-­‐estrangeiro-­‐tera-­‐2-­‐de-­‐iof,453217,0.htm.	  	  
